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FOREWORD
Cicero once pointed out that the crucial sinew of
war is, and always has been, “endless streams of money.” Wars throughout history have been waged for
only as long as the money has held out. If silver and
gold continued to pour forth from a state’s treasury,
then a ruler or government could tap a never-ending
supply of soldiers and war materiel. However, soon
after the supply of coin was expended, armies began
to vanish and sources of supply would dry up. Only
when new methods of providing long-term finances
started to evolve, first in the Netherlands and soon
thereafter through the Bank of England, do we begin
to witness progress toward a financial revolution that
was still evolving at the start of the 20th century. By
World War II, however, this process was complete.
For the first time in recorded history, a major war was
fought where the manpower and productive capacity of states was exhausted before any major state’s
finances gave out.
This monograph provides a survey of the crucial
interplay between finance, national power, and the
capacity to wage war, starting in the ancient era and
progressing through to the present. As such, it demonstrates the crucial importance of economic power,
particularly in the realm of finance, as the basic underpinning of all strategic considerations and plans.
Embedded within this survey, Dr. Lacey provides
in-depth case studies that present new debate-sparking insights, such as: how a military Lilliputian such
as Greece defeated the might of the Persian Empire;
how Rome’s decision to defeat the Huns proved to
be an epic strategic blunder; how Britain’s preparations for hugely increased social spending helped
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win World War I; and, finally, how the Federal Reserve’s inexhaustible money spigot turned the tide of
World War II.
This monograph concludes with some thoughts
about the potential problems the United States will
face in financing military power in the first-half of
the 21st century, as well as the prospects for funding
a major increase in military spending in the event of
a future military crisis. The Strategic Studies Institute
hopes this historical survey will draw attention to an
aspect of military power that is too often neglected.
			

			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph presents a survey of the crucial
link between state (national) power and finance from
the ancient era through the present day. Cicero once
said that the true sinew of war was “endless streams
of money.” His observation remains as accurate today as it was when Rome first began constructing
its Empire.
Unfortunately, too many historical works leave
this crucial underpinning link out of their narratives.
Even those that do economic and financial concerns
typically miss the fact that the size of a state’s economy often has little to do with its capacity to wield influence on the global stage. Much more crucial in this
regard is the possession of an administrative system
capable of efficiently mobilizing a state’s resources.
It was such an administrative apparatus that allowed
Britain to punch far above its weight in the international arena for centuries. As a survey, this work is
far from comprehensive, but the author hopes it will
provide a stepping stone for a much-needed in-depth
examination of the topic.
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GOLD, BLOOD, AND POWER:
FINANCE AND WAR THROUGH THE AGES
Victory has always gone to the side with the more
flourishing production base.
		
		
Paul Kennedy,
		 The Rise and Fall of Great Powers1

Professor Kennedy is wrong. Victory has not always gone to the side with the greatest materiel resources, although that often remains the best wager.
Rather, it has gone to the side best able to mobilize its
resources for the decisive effort of war. Persian production, for example, far exceeded anything available
to Alexander, yet Persia’s mighty 200-year-old empire
collapsed in an historical twinkle under the successive
hammer blows of the formidable Macedonian army.
Likewise, the barbarians who later brought Rome to
its knees possessed almost no production base. Yet,
these barbarians eventually massed sufficient force to
collapse the greatest empire in history, which, for a
variety of reasons, was no longer capable of mobilizing even a fraction of its latent power. In later periods,
one need only look at tiny Britain, which for centuries punched far above its weight in the international
arena as a result of its superior ability to mobilize its
relatively meager national resources for war.
Since the start of organized warfare, the crucial
sinew of war had been “endless streams of money.”2
For as long as the money held out, there was always
a well-armed mercenary for hire. On the other hand,
when the money was gone, the war ended as armies
dissolved for lack of pay. By World War II, however,
money was no longer a crucial concern of the major
belligerents. In every World War II case, production
1

capacity and manpower were exhausted long before
the wherewithal to pay for them. Money concerns
only came to the fore when one nation exhausted its
production base and had to purchase munitions from
other nations. The best example of this was Britain’s
rapid depletion of its foreign reserves to purchase
munitions from the United States in the early days
of World War II, a looming financial disaster that
was averted only by the institution of Lend Lease by
President Franklin Roosevelt.
Throughout history, power has flowed not out of
the barrel of a gun, as Mao famously claimed. Rather,
it has derived from a nation’s ability to amass sufficient funds to prosecute a war. In other words, the
ability to buy Mao’s guns and the ammunition that
goes with them has been, and remains, the crucial element of any strategic policy.3 As Presidential advisor
James Carville famously said, “It’s the economy, stupid,” and in war, this particularly means the financial
aspects of the economy. Despite 3,000 years of experience, historians often ignore the financial aspects of
warfare. To some degree, this is understandable; after
all, it was barely more than a generation ago that most
battle and campaign narratives neglected the effects of
logistics. Despite general awareness of the old adage,
“amateurs talk tactics, while experts talk logistics,”
historians still largely ignored logistical concerns,
except for the periodic mention of famine-induced
disasters. One probable reason for this neglect is that
logistical studies are boring, and recounting logistical
matters invariably slows down the narrative pace of a
campaign history. After all, who really wants to read
about how many trains it took to move ammunition to
the front in 1916 or the hay consumption rate of one of
Marshal Joachim Murat’s cavalry divisions?4
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If military historians find logistics boring, they
find economics and finance are positively “coma-inducing.” Despite their begrudging allowance of logistical concerns into the mainstream of military history,
many historians (there are exceptions) are still barring
the door to the inclusion of economic matters. Two factors likely explain this neglect: economics lacks drama,
and it is difficult to understand. Historians who write
of armies sweeping across continents and who paint
verbal pictures of brutal battlefield carnage have little
desire to delve into the economics that drive the character and form of war. Furthermore, the “dismal science” of economics is not a subject military historians
typically have invested much time in learning.5 Unfortunately, this neglect will likely widen, as economics
continues on its current path toward pure mathematics and model-based econometrics, while slipping further away from its original moorings within a larger
topic of political economy.
ANCIENT WORLD
Herodotus, the father of history, or if you believe
Plutarch, “the father of lies,” lays out for us that history of the start of the great wars without ever really
explaining how relatively insignificant Athens mustered sufficient military force to defeat the fully mobilized might of the Persian Empire. As such, a brief case
study examining the relative wherewithal of the two
contenders might illuminate why a thorough comprehension of the economic, and particularly financial,
context of any conflict is crucial if one is to understand
its outcome.
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Persia vs. Athens.
The Limits of Power.
In the 5th century BC, Persia was the sole superpower.6 Its land mass covered 7.5 million square
miles, reaching from the Aegean Sea to India, and its
population was probably in excess of 40 million. Measured against that standard, Athens was feeble.7 All of
Attica amounted to less than 4,000 square miles, and
in 490 BC possessed probably 150,000 citizens.8 It is
no wonder that many historians considered Athens’
stand at Marathon a forlorn hope, and its victory akin
to a miracle. What is therefore no less remarkable
is that Athens, with a full understanding of Persian
wealth and power, still decided to stand against the
titan. Or did Athens know something that has mostly
been overlooked by later historians?
The first thing to understand about ancient empires is that the latent power that appears available
from just a cursory look at the numbers is illusionary.
Not discounting the organizational achievements of
Darius, it is fair to say that the Roman Empire possessed a superior organization. Despite this, Rome,
even at the height of its power, normally maintained
less than 2 percent of the empire’s total population
under arms, and found that it could only sustain 3
percent mobilization for a limited period of time.9 It
is safe to assume that Persia, despite a slightly inferior
administrative organization, could maintain an approximately equal percentage of it population under
arms.10 It should also be remembered that throughout
most of history, the bulk of the population survived
at the barest subsistence level, and even the slightest change in conditions could bring on famine. In
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these societies, every hand was needed in the fields,
and only a small proportion would be available for a
professional military.11
Two percent of the population of Persia equates
to 800,000 men. But remember, this is a high estimate
of Persian capabilities, and there is reason to believe
that the Persians failed to approach these levels.12 In
this regard, another comparison with Rome may be
beneficial. In the Roman Empire, approximately half
of state revenues went to pay the army.13 However,
after Darius’ early years of high expenditures, a large
proportion of Persian revenues were simply hoarded.
Moreover, Rome paid a high price in political stability, as such large forces concentrated at various points
throughout the empire, which provided a constant
temptation for their commanders to use them in a bid
for ultimate power. Darius, who had come to power by
way of a military coup, knew better than anyone the
danger of maintaining large standing forces without
an external enemy to hold their attention. Therefore,
the Persian permanent military establishment was always small and counted on local levies in the event of
war. In support of this claim, one only has to look at
how long it took to mobilize sufficient forces to crush
the relatively minor Ionian Revolt—5 years.
This is not the end of it, though. Persia’s frontiers
were not secure. Thrace remained restive, and beyond
the Danube, the Scythians were still awaiting any
opportunity to damage the empire, while their kin
on Persia’s northeastern borders were always ready
to sweep down on the Empire’s fertile plains. Keeping these enemies in check required well-garrisoned
fortresses, and one suspects a mobile field force sufficiently large to immediately counter any major
incursion. Moreover, all the other frontiers of the
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empire also required permanently stationed troops.
Further, the Ionian Revolt was a reminder, if any was
needed, that there were a number of subject people
within the polyglot empire who were looking for any
sign of weakness to make their own bid for independence. To forestall this, Darius had to keep a large
number of royal garrisons in large cities and at key
geographical locations.
Finally, one must never lose sight of the cost and
logistical difficulties of sending an expeditionary
army far from the center of power. Again, the Roman
example is instructive. When Caesar began the conquest of Gaul, he had only four legions, with probably an equal number of auxiliaries, for a total force of
about 35,000 men. It is doubtful that he ever had over
50,000 legionaries during the entire war. As another
example, when Crassus, set out to conquer the entire
Parthian Empire, he led out only 45,000 legionnaires.
Even the more resilient and aggressive early Republic
had great difficulty sending substantial forces far from
Italy. Although Republican Rome could maintain over
100,000 troops facing Hannibal in Italy for 16 years,
it strained every resource to maintain a mere 30,000
in nearby Africa for the decisive Zama campaign. In
summary, if the most efficient and warlike empire of
the ancient world could sustain only 50,000 troops on
distant campaigns, can we reasonably expect that the
Persians could do much better? That they did manage
to double this for Xerxes’ 480 BC campaign reflects
that the Persians spent almost half a decade preparing, and that they expected this to be a lightning campaign, which would allow for the demobilization of
most of the army in a very short time.14 More than any
other factor, the inability of Persia to maintain a large
expeditionary force for more than a single campaign-
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ing season accounts for Xerxes’ departure with probably half the army, before they had suffered any major
setback on land.
When judging how much power Darius could
throw against Greece, one must note the fact that the
Persian Empire had just finished crushing the Ionians,
at a cost that must be judged as catastrophic. Victory
had taken over half a decade, and in the process Persia
had lost two fleets, and probably had one extensively
damaged at the Battle of Lade. Furthermore, the Carians had annihilated one field army, and thousands
more Persians must have fallen in other operations.
On top of all this, a substantial part of the empire—
previously the richest portion—was left in ruins. As
this was the region (Ionia) from which the Persians
expected to draw the bulk of the support required for
an invasion of Greece, its economic devastation was a
severe drag on preparations.
On the other side of the equation, the Persians who
were preparing for the Marathon expedition were
probably able to forgo calling up new and untried
levies. The veterans of the Ionian campaigns (probably with a number of defeated Ionians among them)
and Mardonius’ earlier campaign in Thrace were still
available, and Athens offered them rich booty. As very
few of these men would have been survivors of the
Carian disaster, this army would have never tasted
defeat—an inestimable confidence booster. Inured to
hard conditions and familiar with combat, these men
would make formidable foes. They did, however, suffer from one serious weakness. They had never faced
an army of veteran hoplites in a set-piece battle. That
would make all the difference.
Given all of the aforementioned, and extrapolating from the best available estimates of the size of
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Persian armies during the campaigns in Thrace and
Ionia, a supreme Persian effort could have fielded at
best 40,000 troops, and possibly as many sailors for a
campaign in 490 BC.15 It is almost inconceivable that
the Athenians—living in the period, having experienced personally the difficulties of campaigning, and
having a number of citizens (not the least of whom
was Miltiades) with substantial experience with the
Persian army—were not aware of these factors and
limitations. Still, 40,000 troops and a similar number
of sailors was a substantial force. In fact, it was several times larger than the entire hoplite class of Attica.
What advantages did Athens have that convinced its
citizens that making a stand would be more than a
forlorn-hope?
The most important factor on the credit line was
that Athens was going to fight this war on its home
court and would therefore be able to mobilize a far
higher percentage of its population than Persia. If
we accept a total population of Attica of 150,000, that
would mean there were about 30,000-35,000 men of
combat age.16 Of these, the author estimates that Athens could afford to equip 14,000 of them as hoplites.
As there were only 9,000 Athenian hoplites at Marathon, this total requires a defense. First, it is unlikely
that the hoplites at Marathon represented all that was
available to Athens, although it may have consisted
of the best of them. For one thing, there were 4,000
colonists at Chalcis, whom Herodotus tells us were
ordered to go to the aid of Eretria when the Persians
attacked that city.17 They did not arrive in time, and
that is the last Herodotus mentions of them. This represents several thousand hoplites who would not have
mustered with any of the 10 tribal regiments at Marathon. In all probability, they were left on the northern
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frontier to keep watch on Thebes and to harass any
Persian move or cavalry raid in that direction. Moreover, the road from Marathon, guarded by the bulk
of the Athenian army, was indeed the easiest route to
Athens, but not the only one. Other roads and even
paths (the Persians proved at Thermopylae that access
to a goat path was enough for them to inflict a nasty
surprise on an enemy) would have to be strongly garrisoned. The same was true of key positions along
the coast, in order to prevent the Persians from making an amphibious end-run around the encamped
Athenian army.
However, could Athens afford 14,000 hoplites?
The answer is probably yes. During this time, a hoplite was expected to supply his armor and weapons at
his own expense. This cost was not insignificant, and
was a strong limiting factor in the size of the armies
of many Greek cities. However, there were a number
of factors that would have made it easier for many of
Athens’ citizens to afford the entire hoplite panoply.
Foremost among these were the land reforms of Pisistratus. By breaking up numerous large noble estates, he had given thousands of the poor and landless
enough property for them to produce a surplus of food
for sale in the city. This surplus was sufficient to enable thousands of yeoman farmers to purchase armor
and join the privileged ranks of hoplites.18 As Attica
transitioned its primary cash crop from grain to olives,
the surplus created by trading would have been even
greater. Revenues from olive-based trade would also
have paid for a number of city and costal dwellers to
enter the hoplite class. Furthermore, although the richest veins in the Laurion silver mines were discovered
a few years later, the mine was still producing enough
silver to allow the government to subsidize some
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hoplites, if necessary. I have discovered no evidence
that the state was giving or loaning cash to purchase
armor. There is substantial evidence of numerous
loans for farming and other business activities, which
amounts to the same thing. It would be odd indeed if
a city that had been almost constantly at war for the 2
previous decades (against other Greek city-states) did
not do all within its power to increase the size of its
main fighting force.
These constant wars had led to at least three battles that Athens won decisively. Although it is hard to
guess at total numbers of enemy losses, we know that
700 Thebans were captured in one battle, and it might
be assumed that twice that number was killed. Also,
the army of Chalcis was beaten severely enough for
that city to withdraw immediately, and as it was no
longer rated a threat by Athens, it must have demobilized most of its military establishment, i.e., turned
over its armor and weapons to Athens. Megara, a city
about the same size as Chalcis, was able to field 3,000
hoplites in 480 BC, so that is probably a fair estimate
of the size of Chalcis’ army. Finally, the Athenians
killed 1,000 Argive hoplites and an unknown number
of Aeginetans in battle the year before Marathon. A
conservative guess is that, over the years, Athens easily collected enough armor from its enemies to outfit
about 8,000 hoplites. From this, it would seem that
the normally expensive hoplite panoply was probably
available in Athens at drastically reduced prices.19
However, this is not the end of Athens’ mobilization. As the Battle of Marathon was fought after the
harvest, the rest of the male population of Attica was
also available for military duty. These were mostly
the thetes class of poorer citizens, who were used as
light troops.20 These light troops were not mentioned
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by Herodotus as being present at Marathon, but it is
unlikely they would have been left behind, particularly as we know an even lower class—slaves—did
fight in the battle. Like the contemporary accounts of
medieval battles, which habitually left out the contributions of the peasants and foot-soldiers in favor
of the daring deeds of the heavy cavalry (knights),
Herodotus probably did not believe the participation
of these citizens of any account. Although slaves were
normally forbidden from participation in combat, they
were present at every major battle, and in emergencies, they could be freed and permitted to fight in the
ranks.21 Under any circumstances, slaves would have
been present to prepare food, rescue wounded men,
serve as attendants, and, most importantly, act as baggage carriers and caretakers for the hoplites’ armor.22
However, if Athens ever faced an emergency situation, Marathon was it. It is likely that in this crisis,
Athens would have released at least a proportion of
its slaves for combat duties, and evidence for this does
exist. Pausanias states that, during his travels, he was
shown the common grave of the Plataeans and “servants” killed at Marathon.23 There is no way to know
the number of slaves and recently freedmen who traveled with the army, but several thousand would seem a
reasonable estimate.
So, in practical terms, Athens could field a fighting
force at least numerically equal to what the Persians
were capable of throwing at it in 491 BC. More importantly, the core of the Athenian army was made up of
9,000 heavily armored hoplites.
The Athenian victory was indeed stunning.
However, any reasonable assessment makes it clear
that as long as Athens stood on the strategic defensive, the deck was not as stacked against it as is
typically assumed.
11

The Financial Comparison.
According to Herodotus, Darius received 14,560
talents from the empire on an annual basis, although
this was not likely to be his only source of revenue
(for instance, neither tribute from nearby nations, nor
imperial customs duties are included). Translating ancient currency amounts into something understandable to a modern reader is always difficult, but some
effort must be made to present an impression of the
awesome wealth at the empire’s disposal in the event
of war. During Darius’ reign a single talent could pay
the wages for a trireme’s 200-man crew for 2 months,
or the wages of three laborers for 20 years. As trained
soldiers tended to receive a higher rate of pay than day
laborers, a talent would pay the salary for a single soldier for 20 years.24 In other words, if the empire had no
other expenses to pay, which was far from the case, it
could pay a full-time professional force of over a quarter of a million men out of annual revenues. To put this
in perspective, Athens began the Peloponnesian War
with 6,500 silver talents in its treasury, and its annual
revenue was about 1,000 talents (400 internal and 600
from tribute from other members of the empire).25 So,
even at the height of its power, Athens’ annual revenues were approximately 1/15th of Persia’s. It needs
to be remembered that Athens did not have an empire
at the time of the first Persian invasion, nor had it yet
exploited the richest veins of the Laurion silver mines.
An estimate of annual Athenian revenues in the years
preceding Marathon should be placed under 250 talents, with only a percentage of that available for war.
This was approximately a 50th of Persia’s revenues.
(See Figure 1.)
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First Province 400 Talents
Ionians, Magnesians, Aeolians, Carians,
Lycians, Milyans, Pamphylians

Second Province 500 Talents
Mysians, Lydians, Lasonians Kabalians,
Hytennai

Third Province 360 Talents
Phrygians, Thracians, Paphlagonians, Cappadocians, Mariandynians

Fourth Province 500 Talents
Cilicians

Fifth Province 350 Talents
Posideion, Phoencia, Syria, Cyprus

Sixth Province 700 Talents
Egypt, Libya, Cyrene, Barke

Seventh Province 170 Talents
Sattagydians, Gandarians, Dadikai

Eighth Province 300 Talents
Susa, Kissians

Ninth Province 1,000 Talents
Babylonia, Assyria

Tenth Province 450 Talents
Ecbatana, Media, Parikanians,
Orthokorybantians

Eleventh Province 200 Talents
Caspians, Pausikai, Pantimathnoi, Dareitai

Twelfth Province 360 Talents
Baktrians, Aigloi

Thirteenth Province 400 Talents
Paktyike, Armenia

Fourteenth Province 600 Talents
Sagartians, Sarangians, Thamanaians,
Outians, Mykians

Fifteenth Province 250 Talents
Sacae, Sogdiana

Sixteenth Province 300 Talents
Parthians, Chorasmians, Areians

Seventeenth Province 400 Talents
Parikanians, Ethiopians of Asia

Eighteenth Province 200 Talents
Matienians, Saspeires, Alarodians

Figure 1. Tax Rates on Persian Provinces.
Within Persia, this massive transfer of wealth to
the center did not represent the full tax burden on the
peoples of the empire. As none of these tax receipts
were typically transferred back to the provinces, the
local satraps collected additional revenues to pay for
their own upkeep, infrastructure projects, and defense.
This likely amounted to a sizeable sum, as many of the
satrapies had hostile neighbors on their borders and
were expected to see to their own defense against all
but the strongest attacks. However, the tax burden did
not end there. In addition to the satraps, there were a
large number of sub-satraps, regional governors, and
other administrators who collected taxes to pay for
their own maintenance, which was often extravagant.
For instance, the sub-satrap for Judah during this time

13

fed 150 of his officers from his own table every day.26
But even this was not the end. All levels of the Persian government also collected taxes in kind, and tens
of thousands of sheep, mules, and horses and tons of
foodstuffs, incense, ebony, and ivory were taken by
the tax collectors every year.
All of this constituted an enormous burden on the
empire’s economy. It would not have been so bad if
the government had spent the money or found some
other way to keep these funds in circulation. However,
it would be 2,000 years before Britain discovered that
it was economically better to keep its specie in circulation to grow the economy, while still remaining available through taxes and loans in an emergency. Prior to
this, every good ruler stored as much bullion as possible in his treasury as insurance in the event of war or
bad times. The Persians proved to be second to none
at the art of hoarding. This was plainly demonstrated
after Alexander brought the empire crashing down.
Reportedly, after the Macedonians captured the Persian royal treasuries, Alexander seized almost 200,000
talents in gold and silver. This must have seemed a
fantastic sum for an adventurer, who had begun his
march of conquest with only 60 talents in his own
treasury and owing 500 talents to creditors. It should
be noted that this massive sum of Persian treasure was
what remained after Darius III had already drawn
down vast sums to pay for the war against Alexander,
and after he made off with 8,000 talents when he fled
Alexander’s approach.
Over time, the propensity to neglect the role of finance in warfare has not only hampered our understanding of history’s many conflicts, it has also often
led to considerable misrepresentations of history. For
example, the greatest historian of the ancient world,
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Thucydides, in his history of the Peloponnesian
War, made only one mention of the Athenian silver
mines that funded much of the Athenian war effort.
That mention came when he quoted a speech by the
Athenian turncoat, Alcibiades, urging the Spartans to
fortify Decclea:
Whatever property there is in the country will become
yours, either by capture and surrender, and the Athenians will at once be deprived of the revenues of their
silver mines at Laurium.27

Following Thucydides’ lead, for two millennia,
historians have identified Athens’ failed Syracuse
Expedition as the turning point in the Peloponnesian
War. In truth, Athens made good most of the losses
from that campaign in a remarkably short period and
continued the war for another decade. What wrecked
Athenian power was the assault on the economic basis
of its military power: losing the silver revenues from
Laurium, isolation from the revenues of the Delian
League, and, finally, a blockade imposed by a Spartan
fleet (financed by Persia) on the routes between Athens and its Black Sea food sources. One would have
to read Thucydides very closely, indeed, to see that
Athens was defeated through economic warfare and
exhaustion, rather than on the field of battle.
Likewise, the discovery of two major silver mines
in Macedonian-controlled territory is an often-overlooked factor in Phillip’s rise to dominance over
Greece. Just as neglected is the role this new Macedonian wealth played in Alexander’s dismantling of
the powerful Persian Empire. One must wonder how
successful Alexander would have been if he could not
purchase the loyalty of his soldiers by paying them
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two or three times the going wage for the most skilled
masons.28 Once Alexander invaded Persia, the cost of
paying and maintaining this force was approximately
20 talents (about 1,000 pounds of silver) a day, a sum,
despite his silver mines, that was far beyond Alexander’s means.29 Fortunately for his prospects, each conquered Persian city yielded a vast horde of bullion,
including over 50,000 talents in Susa alone.30 If the Persian king, Darius, had spent this money on defense,
rather than hoarding it, Alexander’s invasion would
likely have been crushed before it got far out of the
starting gate.31 After Alexander’s death, this vast treasure financed decades of war by the Diadochi, paying
for armies on a scale rarely seen in the ancient world.
In the Roman era, military historians marvel at
the brilliant maneuvers and stratagems of Hannibal
and his nemesis, Scipio. However, much more rarely
mentioned are the silver mines Hannibal controlled in
Spain, which allowed him to keep his army in the field
for almost 2 decades without any additional financial
support from Carthage. This factor also helps explain
Scipio’s strategy for defeating Carthage by first invading Spain, rather than trying to best Hannibal’s army
in Italy. By cutting Hannibal off from his inexhaustible source of finance and simultaneously securing
the silver mines for Rome, Scipio ensured Hannibal’s
eventual defeat as surely as if he had vanquished him
on the field of battle.32
In the end, the Punic Wars proved a financial bonanza for Rome. In the first two Punic Wars, however,
victory almost eluded Rome due to financial collapse.
To turn the tide of the First Punic War, Rome required
a new fleet capable of wresting control of the seas
around Sicily from Carthage. But after 20 years of
war, the state was bankrupt. Salvation came in what
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Polybius calls their “patriotic and generous spirit,”
Rome’s wealthiest citizens came forward with enough
donations to build 200 quinqueremes, which were crucial to winning the decisive victory at the Battle of
Aegates.33 Rarely mentioned, however, is the fact that
these citizens were promised repayment with interest after Rome’s ultimate victory, making this the first
recorded instance of a debt-financed war.
In the Second Punic War, after losing three consular armies at the Battles of Lake Trasimene and
Cannae, Rome was in such dire financial straits that it
nearly sued for peace. Just to feed the fleet, Rome was
forced to borrow the price of 6 months of corn from
Hiero of Sicily—the first record of international borrowing to finance a war.34 In fact, the loss of so many
wealthy citizens in these battles so decimated the tax
rolls that Rome could not, for a time, finance the rebuilding of its army or send a planned expedition to
Spain. The Senate considered raising the tax rate, but
voted the measure down lest it financially ruin Rome’s
remaining taxpayers.35 In the end, a Roman praetor
was sent to the markets to ask the tradesmen to supply the army on credit, “on condition that as soon as
there was money in the treasury, they should be the
first to be paid.”36 As the financial crisis continued
into the following year, Rome was forced to seize a
trust fund put aside for widows and orphans, further
defer contractor payments, and withhold the pay of
cavalrymen (typically wealthier citizens) and centurions. Only Scipio’s victories in Spain, which filled Roman coffers with plunder and the rich ores of Spanish
silver mines, alleviated Rome’s financial straits and
allowed it to prosecute the war to victory.
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Victory in the Punic Wars brought Rome a financial windfall that financed its continued military conquests, which soon began paying for themselves. In
just the 50 years after the defeat of Carthage, Roman
currency in circulation increased by a factor of 10, as
seizures and tribute from the newly conquered provinces poured into its coffers. In addition to the 14,000
talents demanded from Carthage in reparations,
Sidon was forced to pay 15,000 talents, while 12,000
talents were extorted from Greece. Thousands of more
talents were seized from former Carthaginian possessions in Spain, while the output of Spanish mines was
doubled by the liberal application of slave labor.37 By
such methods, the pattern of Rome’s expansionary
wars paying for themselves was established, at least
until Caesar’s costly conquest of Gaul.
For much the same reason that Rome and Scipio
decided to fight Carthage in Spain, Caesar, in his war
against Pompey a century-and-a-half later, invaded
Spain before moving east to confront Pompey’s gathering army. After exhausting the 15,000 gold bars and
30,000 silver bars that he had seized from the Roman
treasury at the outset of the war, Caesar found himself in dire financial straits. His army was a capable
and veteran force, but one that would melt away in an
instant if it was not paid. He dearly needed the silver
from Spain’s mines to carry on the war. Historians,
focusing on the military dynamics of the situation,
have often wondered what was behind Caesar’s propaganda statement, “I go to meet an army without a
leader, and I shall return to meet a leader without an
army.”38 The reality is that Caesar chose his main theater of operations not because Pompey had stationed
seven legions there, but because Spain was where
the mines he needed to finance an extended conflict
were located.
18

Lost in most analyses of the conflict is a fact Caesar
knew well: the base of Pompey’s power was Spain’s
wealth. Knowing it would take time to mobilize the
wealth of the eastern portions of Rome’s empire, Pompey had placed seven legions in Spain to protect his
source of funds and recruits. Caesar knew that without access to Spain’s mines, Pompey would inevitably
find it difficult to finance his army.39 As it turned out,
through Herculean efforts, Pompey extorted sufficient
money to raise an Eastern army, but it was a near-run
thing, and his raids on temples throughout Asia Minor and confiscation of their gold and silver did much
to undermine his local support.40
For the several hundred years that the Roman Empire existed, finance remained inextricably linked to
Rome’s military power. In fact, the word “soldier”
is derived from the name of the gold coin issued by
the Emperor Constantine—the solidus.41 The argument has been made with considerable justification
that the Western Empire foundered when its financial
system broke down and Rome could no longer gather
the specie to pay the legions.42 A perfect example of
this is the Roman crisis of the 3rd century. By almost
any measure, the situation appeared as bad as it did 2
centuries later when the Empire finally collapsed. The
key difference was that in the 3rd century crisis, Rome
maintained its hold on the wealthiest tax-generating
core of the Empire, and used this wealth to first stabilize the situation and then reverse it.
In the 5th century, however, Rome made a terrible
strategic mistake. By concentrating its military force
against the Huns, who were ravaging less crucial
(from a financial point of view) areas of the Empire
(Gaul), Rome allowed a rather insignificant number
of Vandals to rampage across North Africa. When the
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Vandals captured Carthage and entrenched themselves throughout the province, they effectively broke
the tax spine that maintained the military might of the
Empire. Unable to raise sufficient funds elsewhere to
sustain its legions, Rome’s final collapse was merely a
matter of time.
The reasons for the collapse of the Western Roman
Empire to barbarians that the Republic or early Empire
would have easily vanquished has puzzled historians
for over 1,500 years. As such, it is worth examining in
more detail the underlying financial constraints that I
believe provides much of the explanation.
The Fall of Rome.
Breaking the Tax Spine.
At the center, there was Rome, which maintained
itself through taxes drawn from the wealth and productive capacity of the rest of the empire.43 As Keith
Hopkins has points out, the Roman Empire had three
distinct segments:44
1. The outer ring of the frontier provinces in which
the defensive armies were stationed;
2. An inner ring of rich, tax exporting provinces
(Gaul, Spain, Egypt, North Africa, Asia Minor, and
Syria); and,
3. The center, Rome, later joined by Constantinople.
The crucial element of Rome’s long-term survival,
therefore, rested on keeping the tax-exporting provinces secure and stable. Only by doing so, could the
Roman elite maintain themselves in luxury, while still
feeding approximately one-quarter million Roman
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citizens free of charge. Moreover, by the time of the
empire, neither Rome nor the Italian peninsula produced sufficient excess wealth to sustain itself, and
neither could pay even a small fraction of the cost
of a large professional army. Therefore, it fell to the
provinces to fund the frontier armies, on which their
safety and prosperity depended. Even at the time,
Rome recognized that the frontier provinces or zones
would never produce enough wealth to sustain the
troops stationed there. The great Cicero, a republican
who never confronted the expense of empire, was
known to complain that many provinces were barely
able to pay anything in their own defense.45 Strabo,
who wrote prior to Rome’s invasion of Britain, did not
believe it could support the cost of even one legion.46
And yet, throughout much of the empire’s existence,
it continuously stationed at least four legions on
the island.
As Keith Hopkins notes the process of building the
empire paid for itself:
Conquest by the Romans disrupted established patterns even in economically advanced regions: Romans
plundered the stored reserves of generations, from
towns, temples and from rich individuals treasure
chests. They siphoned off skilled and unskilled labor
as slaves; they gave loans to oppressed landowners
and then distrained upon their estates, when they
were unable to pay extortionate rates of interest.46a

As the Empire ceased its previously rapid expansion,
this source of funding dried up, and it had to rely on
its own internal resources to support its strategic policies.47 Anyone trying to grasp the full range of strategic
options available to Rome must first comprehend the
extent of this resource base. Using recent estimates,
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Raymond W. Goldsmith places Roman government
expenditures during the Augustan era at between
600 and 825 million sesterces.48 This amounts to between 3 and 4 percent of the total national product of
the empire. While Rome may have been able to raise
a few percent more during times of crisis or civil war,
such spending could not be long sustained.49 Given
the practical economic limits placed on Roman expenditures how much of a military force could the empire bear? Through the first 3 centuries of the empire,
Rome, on average, spent approximately 450 million
(perhaps as high as 500 million) sesterces annually on
the maintenance of its military. This represents about
half of total imperial expenditures during the early
empire.50 For this, they got a military establishment
of 150,000 legionaries, 150,000 auxiliaries, a Praetorian Guard, transport, and a navy.51 Interestingly, the
amount Rome spent on its military is only a fraction
of the personal revenues and expenditures of the Roman elite, which was several times that of the empire’s
treasury. This disparity likely increased in the later
empire, as private fortunes grew even as the Empire
began having trouble maintaining its tax base. Rome’s
inability, or unwillingness, to access the accumulated
wealth of its elites was a crucial handicap when the
funds necessary to secure the Empire ran short. Nero
may not have fiddled as Rome burned, but many of
its richest citizens continued leading the high-life
even as the Goths, Vandals, and Franks poured across
the frontiers.

22

Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)
Per Capita in
Sesterces Wheat
1990 International Dollars

Goldsmith

Hopkins

Scheidel

Lo Cascio

Maddison

(AD 14)

(AD 14)

(AD 150)

(AD 150)

(AD 14)

HS380
843 kilograms (kg)

HS 225
491-kg

HS 260
680-kg
$620

HS 380
855-kg
$940

HS 380
843-kg
$570

Figure 2. Roman Per Capita GDP as Given
by the Main References for this Section.52
Evidence clearly indicates that Roman policymakers were aware of these limits. As Elio Lo Cascio states:
What we know of the ratonarium, which was published
regularly by Augustus and his successors, and the
breviarium totius imperii left by Augustus at his death,
shows that state authorities kept track of the various
elements of income and expenditure.53

The pains Augustus took to reorganize the taxation
system of the Principate further attests to this knowledge. During the Empire’s early years, a:
uniform, if not universal, criteria for counting subjects
and assessing their wealth were extended first of all to
the provvciae Caesaris, the provinces under the direct
control of the emperor, and later to the provinciae populi as well.54

Rome may have been what most historians call a “low
tax state,” and most of the evidence does seem to indicate that the Roman yoke was not particularly harsh.
Still, these historians are examining Roman tax rates
from a modern standpoint where collecting under 5
percent of GDP in annual taxes does indeed appear
miniscule. In relation to other pre-industrial mostly
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subsistence economies, however, the Romans were as
good as any, and better than most, when it came to
revenue collection. Only Egypt and the Persian Empire of Darius, where wealth was far more concentrated on a per capita basis, did better. In later centuries,
Western European rulers did not approach Roman
levels of revenue collection until the early modern
era. By creating a taxation infrastructure capable of
drawing substantial revenue toward the center Rome
was able to compensate for a GDP per capita that was
probably only half that of Western Europe in the latemedieval era.
Population Revenues

Revenues Per Head

(Millions)

(Tons of Silver)

(Grams of Silver)

17
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41

Egypt (250 BC)

7

384

55

Rome (AD1)

50

825

17

Rome (AD 150)

50

1,050

21

Byzantium (850 BC)

10
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15

Abbasids (AD 800)

26
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48

Tang (AD 850)

50

2,145

43

France (AD 1221)

8.5

20.3

2.4

England (AD 1203)

2.5

11.5

4.6

Persia (350 BC)

Figure 3. Population and Tax Revenues
350 BC to AD 1200.55
However, as noted in the body of this report, when
it comes to military power, the total amount of national wealth is secondary to a nation’s ability to mobilize whatever wealth is available. For this reason, a
strategist cannot examine Roman revenues in isolation. Wealth and the ability to draw on such wealth
for military purposes must always be weighed against
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enemy capabilities. In this regard, Rome had a distinct
advantage through the first few centuries of the Empire, particularly in Western Europe. According to
Angus Maddison, the barbarian region (in the early
Empire) was only half as populous as the Roman Empire and had a per capita GDP of $400.56 Such a level is
just barely enough for survival and leaves little excess
for a centralized authority to build the structures of
a functioning state. This alone, accounts for the fragmentation of the barbarian tribes through the first two
centuries of the Empire, a situation that changed as
the tribes grew richer in succeeding centuries.
On Rome’s eastern front, the Parthian Empire was
much richer and possessed an infrastructure capable
of collecting substantial funds and deploying them
for military purposes. In fact, Parthia proved quite
capable of defending itself against Roman incursions
(Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae in 53 BC and Mark Anthony’s disastrous invasion in 37 BC) despite periodic
setbacks, such as those inflicted by the emperors Trajan and Severus. When facing Rome, however, Parthia
was almost always on the defensive. Pressed by barbarians on its own northern and eastern borders, along
with continuous upheavals within the ruling dynasty,
Parthia was never able to mount a formidable challenge to Roman power. This dramatically changed,
however, when the Sassanid Persians overthrew the
Parthian Empire in AD 224. The new Persian dynasty
was highly centralized and determined to reconquer
all of the lands that formally made up the great Persian
Achaemenid Empire, which included the bulk of the
Eastern Roman Empire. For the next several centuries,
until the coming of the Arab invasions in the early7th century, the Sassanids remained a mortal threat to
the Empire.
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In summary, the Roman Empire possessed vast,
but not unlimited riches. Given the character of the
economy, its low growth rate in the early centuries, followed by a declining economic situation from at least
the Antonine Plague (AD 165-180) forward, the size of
the Roman military establishment likely represented
the greatest possible sustained effort the empire was
capable of maintaining. As long as its enemies were
fragmented and/or weak, this was sufficient to guard
the frontiers and maintain internal stability. However, as Rome’s economic fortunes declined and its
enemies grew in wealth and strength, the Empire was
hard pressed to maintain the integrity of the frontiers.
Compounding this was a corrupted political order,
particularly after the period of the “good emperors”
that increasingly damaged the empire’s internal stability and often denuded the frontier of legionary protection just when it was most needed. Still, as long as
Rome was able to protect and make use of its core
central tax base, it had the wherewithal to survive,
counterattack, and restore its fortunes. Nowhere is
this better displayed then by Rome’s recovery from
the “3rd Century Crisis.” However, when the “tax
spine” was broken, as it was in the 5th century, Rome
and its empire were doomed.
In the 3rd century, under the relentless pressure of
barbarian invasions, civil war, and natural disasters,
the empire began to disintegrate. At one point, it even
split into three major parts: Britain, Gaul, and Hispania
broke off in AD 258 to form the Gallic Empire; 2 years
later, the eastern governor created his own Palmyrene
Empire out of the provinces of Syria, Palestine, and
Aegyptus. However, he died soon thereafter, leaving his son, Vaballathus, a weakling who was thoroughly controlled by his mother, Zenobia, to lead the
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eastern legions in a war of conquest into Syria, Egypt,
and Lebanon.
As bad as this fragmentation was, the true damage to the Empire’s future prospects was the economic
changes that were occurring almost unnoticed against
the backdrop of military crisis. As widespread unrest
made safe travel for merchants impossible, the vast
Roman trading network broke down. This breakdown
hugely exacerbated a financial crisis that began when
Rome needed to find new funds to defend the Empire, and that grew worse as various provinces were
devastated or broke away. As a result, cities and large
landowners began establishing autarkic economic
zones. This was a profound economic change, as wide
swathes of the Empire stopped exporting or importing goods. From this point on, these regions would
look only to themselves for subsistence crops, as well
as many manufactures. At the same time, many cities, no longer confident that legions could hold the
frontier lines, began looking to their own defenses
and erecting walls. These changes to the basic fabric
of the empire would make themselves felt in the following century. By then, local leaders, economically
independent and despairing of support from Rome,
rather than fight and see their property ravaged,
began finding it advisable to come to terms with
invading barbarians.57
Ancient Roman historian Michael Grant states,
“That the survival of the Empire, in the face of intolerable odds, is something of a miracle, and one of the
most remarkable phenomena in human history.”58
While saving the empire was remarkable, it was not
a miracle, for the Empire, even in this dark hour, still
possessed formidable strength. As a result of invasions and revolts, the Empire was forced back upon
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it core provinces, and here it found salvation. Despite
everything that had gone wrong, the core of the Empire (Byzantium and Anatolia, Italy, Spain, and, most
importantly, North Africa) remained wealthy enough
for one great effort. All that was required was leadership, which, when it was most needed, was found
in the emperors Gallienus, Aurelian (the self-declared
restorer of the Empire), and Diocletian. In a series of
lightning campaigns, these emperors reunited the
Empire, restored the borders (except for Dacia, which
was abandoned), and damaged the Sassanids sufficiently to negotiate a 30-year-long peace. It was only
after Julian was defeated by the Sassanids almost 100
years later (AD 363), coupled with the loss of the Eastern field army to a Gothic force at Adrianople, in AD
378 that the Roman world began its final decent.
5th Century Collapse.
After the Roman defeat at Adrianople, the barbarian Goths devastated the Balkans before being induced
to move west, where they sacked Rome itself in AD
410. Rome survived that shock, and the Goths eventually moved on to southwestern Gaul where they were
settled. Unfortunately, Rome was given no time to restore its frontier defenses so as to properly confront
the large populations of barbarians, who, pressured
by the Huns to the east, began their migration into the
empire. Unchecked by any Roman army, Vandals, Alans, Suevi, Franks, and many others moved across the
Rhine river. Great cities—Trier, Tournai, Arras, and
Rheims—were sacked as the invaders cut away large
regions of the empire as permanent settlements for
themselves. They met with little resistance, as those in
the path of these invaders, having developed autarkic
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economic systems and no longer protected by Roman
arms, found accommodation preferable to resistance.
Still Rome was not beaten. For all appearances, the
current crisis does not appear to have been as bad as
what the Empire survived in the 3rd century. Despite
some incursions, the Eastern Empire remained powerful and remarkably unscathed during this period.
Moreover, the imperial army, now mostly consisting
of barbarian troops, was still capable of fighting force.
In fact, as late as AD 451 at the Battle of Chalons or
Catalaunian Fields, a Roman field army along with
Gothic allies defeated Attila’s Hunnic force, precipitating the collapse of the short-live Hunnic Empire.
So, although, Rome’s entire strategic enterprise, at
least in the West, had collapsed, the empire was not
yet without resources. Even if the Eastern emperor,
dealing with problems of his own, could not be prevailed on to send assistance, for a time, much of Italy
remained free of barbarians. More importantly, North
Africa, the jewel and breadbasket of the Empire, remained untouched. These regions, in conjunction with
resources drawn from other provinces not yet ravaged
(Sicily), were likely sufficient for Rome to undertake
the re-conquest of what had been lost. After the defeat
of the Huns, the remaining barbarian tribes averaged
between 10,000 and 30,000 warriors. Moreover, they
were fragmented and incapable of combined action.
In short, none of these tribes was a match for a welltrained and well-led Roman field army, which, as
proven at Chalons, Rome was still capable of fielding.
So why was Rome not able to repeat the feat of the
3rd century and restore, if not all, at least the bulk of
the Western Empire? Among a host of reasons historians have presented, one great strategic blunder stands
out. Totally fixated on the deluge of barbarians cross-

29

ing the Rhine and then later on the Hunnic threat,
the Romans allowed an earlier invader, the Vandals,
to enter Africa in AD 429. Once the Vandals had captured Carthage, in AD 439, they controlled the African
grain supply that propped up the Western Empire. As
Chris Wickham relates:
The Vandals broke the Mediterranean infrastructure
of the West, the source of most of the city of Rome’s
food. The food had largely been supplied free, in tax;
the Vandals were autonomous, however, and kept the
African produce for themselves—although they were
prepared to sell it. The Carthage-Rome tax spine ended. The population of the city of Rome began to lessen
precipitously after the mid-fifth century, in the next
it dropped more than 80 percent. And a gaping hole
appeared in the carefully balanced fiscal system of the
western empire; the Romans faced a fiscal crisis, just
when they needed to spend as much on troops as they
possibly could.59

Wickham continues:
Not foreseeing that Geiseric would take Carthage . . .
is arguably the main strategic error of the imperial
government in the 5th century: the moment when the
political break-up of the imperial government became
a serious possibility.60

The breaking of Rome’s “tax spine” tore out the economic machinery of the Western Empire.61 Without
economic resources, not even the most brilliant strategic conception could be enacted. After 500 years of
adhering to a simple strategic formulation, Rome, in
the mid-5th century, had forgotten its cardinal tenet—
defend, at all cost, the rich economic core. Once this
was lost, so was the Western Roman Empire.
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DARK AGES
The end of the Western Roman Empire accelerated
an economic decline that had become evident more
than a century before.62 By the middle of the 5th century, coins were no longer used as a medium of exchange
in Britain; by the middle of the 6th century, the issue
of new silver and gold coins ceased throughout what
had been the Western Roman Empire. It would be 200
years before coins were again minted within the region.63 As a result, trade was nearly extinguished, and
central authority in most areas collapsed. This period
marks the final break between the ancient classical era
and the emergence of what has become known as the
Dark Ages.64
As the financial system broke down, coins became
scarce. In the decades immediately after the fall of
Rome, barbarian kings often tried to maintain the Roman tax system for their own purposes. It was a losing game, as the political fragmentation of the Empire,
coupled with the disruption of trading networks, soon
worked their effects on the tax system. As coins gradually disappeared, kings took ever greater amounts
of their tax haul “in-kind,” but this only slowed the
decay, it did not stop it. For instance, by the 6th century, the Frankish Merovingian kings were taxing only
their ever-dwindling numbers of Roman subjects, exempting all Franks from such payments. By the next
century, taxation was so unpopular among all classes
that it was viewed as an abuse of power and halted.65
From this point, kingly (that is to say central government) revenues were based on the funds a king could
raise from his own royal lands rather than through
taxes drawn on the entire population or wealth of a
country. For most of the period coinciding with the
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Merovingian Dynasty, there were sufficient royal
lands to parcel out to followers to purchase the loyalty of the army. In fact, land available for presenting
to followers in return for military service lasted much
longer than many would have thought possible, as the
Merovingian kings were able to reclaim many lands
upon a recipient’s death or through assorted legal
maneuvers. Sooner or later, however, the land had to
give out, and during Frankia’s 7th century civil wars,
it finally did.
The rising “mayors of the palace”—Charles Martel and his sons, Pepin and Carloman—were quick to
take advantage of the resulting Merovingian decline
to push forward their claims of leadership. They too
had to pay their soldiers with land, but they added a
couple of new twists. First, they compelled churches
and monasteries to turn over much of the land they
had been accumulating for centuries.66 Then they
ceased distributing land in small plots to individual
soldiers in favor of giving large estates to loyal vassals. In return, these vassals would use the revenues
from their estates to equip and train a force of soldiers
that had to answer the mayors’ call to arms. Here, we
see the primary origins of the feudal system, rooted in
the Frankish king’s lack of silver and gold.67
As Western Europe began its emergence from the
Dark Ages, a new barbarian plague descended on the
continent—the Vikings.68 At first, the Vikings limited
themselves to relatively minor raids, such as that at
Lindisfarne in AD 793. However, starting with the AD
865 arrival of the “great host” in England, the Vikings
adopted a course of conquest and settlement. Over the
next few generations, successive invasions left most of
England under Viking control—an area known as the
Danelaw. By the middle of the 9th century, only Wes-
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sex, under its king, Alfred the Great, still resisted the
Viking onslaught. Historians rightly credit Alfred the
Great with saving his kingdom of Wessex by building England’s first standing army, a fortified system
of burhs (fortified town), and even a small fleet. It remains little noted that the backbone of Wessex’s resistance lay in Alfred’s remaking of the kingdom’s financial administration.69 To pay for his troops, navy, and
military construction, Alfred instituted a new taxation
system and redoubled the Anglo-Saxon effort to mint
sufficient coinage to keep Wessex on a permanent
war footing.70
Alfred’s reorganization and military operations
were successful mostly due to the early attention he
paid to finance, particularly restoring the integrity of
the kingdom’s coinage and the expansion of the mint
network. Upon taking the throne, there were only
two mints operating in his realm (Canterbury and
London). Alfred expanded this to eight mints, each of
which was placed in one of his strongest burhs, all purposely sited near a port so as to ease the transport of
continental silver to the mints. From the outpouring of
these mints, Alfred collected a fee of between 5 and 25
percent. Moreover, the creation of a moneyed economy made it easier for Alfred to collect taxes, tolls, and
fines in silver, rather than “in-kind” payments (corn
or wheat).71 Without this strong financial base, Wessex
could never have withstood the Viking onslaught. In
fact, Alfred’s most enduring legacy was the basic administrative and financial system he bequeathed his
successors.
Although Alfred’s successor, Edward, grimly
held onto his gains, in the end, the Viking assaults
proved too much for the fractured states left in the
wake of Rome’s collapse. Within a generation of Al-
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fred’s death, England was paying off the invaders in a
yearly tribute known as the Danegeld. The sums England paid out in Danegeld were huge when compared
to any previous post-Roman standard.72 While often
viewed as a drain on England’s limited resources, the
Danegeld was actually a strong driving force in lifting
the country out of the Dark Ages.73 As the system of
taxation handed down by Alfred proved insufficient
for collecting the huge sums required for the Danegeld,
the Anglo-Saxons were forced to create a centralized
administration system that drew England together
as a unified state and became the basis of its military
institutions. Although William the Conqueror later
imposed a feudal system on top of this English administrative system, he and his Norman successors were
careful not to disturb the Anglo-Saxon organizations
that proved second-to-none in the systematic mobilization of funds throughout the Middle Ages. These
funds, in turn, allowed England to influence international events far beyond what its resources implied as
its limits for over 100 years.
THE MIDDLE AGES
Still, in the years after William’s death in 1087, the
demands of almost constant war nearly overwhelmed
England’s finances, and the silver content of its coins
became so debased that the Kingdom often verged on
financial collapse.74 In one instance, after his mercenaries complained that their pay was in debased coins
(silver content below the standard 92.5 percent) Henry I, rather than adopt a program of fiscal restraint,
blamed his problems on dishonest minters, who were
supposedly diluting the silver content of the realm’s
coins so they could profit from the excess. To help
“encourage” them to produce coins with more intrin34

sic value, on Christmas Day 1124, he called the country’s 150 mint-masters to Winchester Castle to defend
themselves against charges of debasing the currency.
In the end, 94 of them were found guilty and each had
his right hand and one testicle removed. Given the
state of medicine at the time, most of these unfortunates likely died.75 For a short period, the quality of
money improved, and Henry I’s mercenaries in Normandy got back to their brutal work. However, by the
end of his reign in 1135, the quality of silver coins was
again at a low-point, and the mint-masters had learned
not to put their names or other identifying marks on
their coins.
The quality of English currency completely collapsed in the next decade’s period of anarchy, as
Henry’s daughter, Matilda, and his nephew, Stephen,
fought a civil war over the crown. Only when Henry II
ascended the throne in 1154 was there a decisive move
to improve the quality of English currency and to put
the monarchy on a firm financial footing. Henry’s reforms (reducing the number of mints from over 100
to six and placing the issue of currency under firm
royal control) made the English silver penny the preferred medium of exchange throughout Europe, and
inaugurated a period of 200 years of currency stability in England.76 This stable currency was employed
to fund England’s extensive military adventures on
the European Continent and the formation of the Angevin Empire. However, holding on to these French
territories required almost constant fighting and vast
expense for the crown. Under such conditions the feudal system, which required a vassal to give his lord 40
days of fighting, proved useless. In order to maintain
full-time garrisons and a permanent standing army in
the field, Henry II demanded cash from his lords in
lieu of military service (scuttage). The proceeds from
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this scuttage allowed Henry to maintain a professional
standing army and marked the beginning of the end
for feudalism.77
Although England’s financial system, which others
mimicked as best they could, was the most efficient
seen for several hundred years, its success must be
judged against the chaos of the Dark Ages. During the
medieval era, no king ever approached the efficiency
with which the ancients collected funds to support
their empires. In the early-13th century, for example,
French revenues averaged about 2.4 grams of silver
per head, while English efficiency almost doubled
that, at 4.6 grams per head. This explains how English kings were able to hold their own in a series of
wars against a much larger and wealthier France. Still,
both countries revenues fell far short of the 21 grams
per head that Rome was collecting at the height of its
power, and was not even in the same league as the
still dangerous Arab Caliphs, who were soaking their
richer population for 48 grams per head.
Population Revenues

Revenues Per Head

(Millions)

(Tons of Silver)

(Grams of Silver)

Persia (350 BC)

17

697

41

Egypt (250 BC)

7

384

55

Rome (AD 1)

50

825

17

Rome (AD 150)

50

1,050

21

Byzantium (850 BC)

10

150

15

Abbasids (AD 800)

26

1,260

48

Tang (AD 850)

50

2,145

43

France (AD 1221)

8.5

20.3

2.4

England (AD 1203)

2.5

11.5

4.6

Figure 4. Population and Tax Revenues
350 BC to AD 1200.78

36

The inability of European rulers to grow their
economies and develop crucial administrative systems explains almost all of the European way of war
in the Middle Ages. Lacking large financial resources, rulers never possessed the capacity to wage war
on the scale of the ancients. Moreover, without the
money to maintain large standing armies, kings had
little hope of unifying their feudal underlings into a
cohesive state.
The greatest Western military adventure of the
Middle Ages, the Crusades, clearly demonstrates how
a paucity of funds can directly affect military operations. There is little doubt that just mounting the First
Crusade in 1069 drained a significant portion of the
West’s wealth. Almost every noble who went on crusade was forced to sell his estate or pawn whatever
other property he owned to cover the expense of raising a force he could take with him to the Holy Land.
In fact, so much money left for the East that many
mints (which were typically kept busy reminting older coins) closed. All through Western Europe, money
went into retreat.79 This was not without some benefit
to Western rulers. Since the Crusades drew off significant numbers of troublesome knights and mercenaries, it is often credited with giving Europe a breathing
spell from the previous era of incessant feudal wars.
In truth, the general peace that descended on Europe
was a natural result of much of its financial liquidity
being drained off to the East. Without ready cash, Europe’s remaining nobles did not have the wherewithal
to wage war. Within a very short time, only kings
could scrape up enough cash to pursue the continuous
rounds of warfare that had previously been endemic
to Western Europe. As a direct result, Europe’s kings
began centralizing political power, a process repeated
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by some of the greater barons, who also took the opportunity to increase their domains at the expense of
poorer rivals. Europe was still a long way from the
creation of true nation-states, but it is here that one
sees their embryonic form.
Despite this crushing expenditure, the First Crusade was only brought to a successful conclusion
through the generosity of the Byzantine Empire and
the seizure of Arab and Christian wealth along the
Crusaders’ path of conquest. Once created, however,
the Crusader kingdom operated on a shoestring budget, and constantly sought donations from the impoverished West. In fact, lack of money was the key
factor in the Crusaders’ devastating defeat at the decisive Battle of the Horns of Hattin in 1187.80 England’s
Henry II, under pressure from the Pope to assist the
Crusaders, forwarded 20,000 pounds of silver to the
Mid-East, which was kept in various Knights Templar
and Hospitaller strongholds. Unfortunately for the
Crusaders, Henry considered this silver part of his
own reserves. Unwilling to part with a silver hoard
he thought he may one day require for his own needs
(possibly a Crusade of his own), Henry forbade anyone to spend any of his stored funds. So, at its moment
of crisis, the Crusader Kingdom found itself strapped
for the cash needed to buy allies and mercenaries, and
unable to use the vast sums Henry had on deposit only
a few miles from the King of Jerusalem’s household.
Although Henry relented after the battle was lost and
Jerusalem had fallen, it was too late to turn the tide.
One great benefit of the Crusades was the early development of a system for financial transfers. The crusading orders of knights, particularly the Templars,
not only watched over Henry’s silver and pilgrims,
but also offered a number of other financial services to
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people traveling to the Holy Land. Foremost among
these was the transfer of funds. Rather than risk losing
a lifetime of savings (and borrowings) on the perilous
journey to the Holy Land, a lord, knight, or pilgrim
would deposit his silver at a Templar stronghold
in Europe and receive a demand note in exchange.
This note would be presented at a Templar castle in
the Holy Land and the appropriate funds would be
given to the bearer, minus a percentage the Templars
charged for this service. As a result of this and other
services, many economic historians credit the warlike
Templars as the driving force behind the emergence
of modern banking in Europe. Whatever the merits
of this argument, a new breed of merchant-banker
soon adopted many of the Templar financial devices,
first in Italy and later throughout Western Europe.
These new financial methods provided the cash that
propelled a huge upswing in economic activity and
at the same time made it possible to fight wars on a
previously unimagined scale.81
It was at this point that the expense of wars between
proto-states increased enormously.82 By the start of
Edward III’s reign in 1312, the feudal military organization was only a memory. In its place were “contract
armies” that were maintained at the king’s expense.83
As a result of accelerating financial requirements and
the corresponding need to raise as much revenue as
possible without disturbing internal stability more
than necessary, rulers began calling on parliaments
(the English name—other states used different titles
for similar organizations) to approve and assist in
raising funds. So began a long process that eventually
led to governments formed by and through the governed.84 Through their parliaments, rulers were able
to increase taxation greatly, while limiting the chance
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of revolts. But when even this failed to produce the
required revenues, kings were forced to borrow.
In the century prior to this, the credit systems of
European nations were barely developed and “based
largely on dealings with the Jews.”85 “But in the second half of the 13th century,” as W. M. Ormond states,
“the Italian merchant bankers began to establish themselves in the principal economic centers of Western
Europe.”86 Kings in the late-Middle Ages quickly discovered that these new Italian sources with their advanced financing methods could provide a source of
previously unexploited funds, and thus they no longer
had to rely on what they could raise or extort at home.
Going into debt to fight a war was not unknown, but
the ability to raise substantial funds from distant foreign creditors was novel. Moreover, by going into debt,
they could draw on what, at least initially, must have
appeared to be unlimited foreign wealth. In the year
1294 alone, one Italian banking family (the Franzesi
Brothers) lent the French crown 200,000 livres tournois,
a sum greater than the annual revenues of the realm.
Bankers soon became so important that they became
a military objective in their own right. For instance,
France’s Philip IV sent troops to imprison and seize
the assets of the Riccardi of Lucca banking family so
as to halt their financing of England’s Edward I’s military operations in France.87 Once captured, the bankers were of no further use to Edward I, so he promptly
seized all of their English assets to help pay for his
wars in France and Scotland.88
Later in the century, the opening phases of the
Hundred Year’s War took financial requirements
to new heights.89 One can get an idea of the cost of
the war by comparing the conflict’s two great campaigns—Crecy and Agincourt. For Crecy, Edward III
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mustered over 1,500 ships to transport an army that
may have numbered near 25,000 men. Despite strenuous efforts to fund the largest force possible, Henry
V, only 60 years after the Battle of Crecy, was able to
field a navy and army only about half the size of Edward’s. Much of the difference is accounted for by the
huge economic dislocation caused by the Black Death.
Still, a large portion of it is a result of the economic destruction caused by the war itself. These costs of war
were measured not only by the devastation wrought
throughout much of France (a substantial portion of
which was English owned and therefore part of England’s tax base), but also by the damaged credit ratings of the participants and the financial wreckage it
left across Europe. At one point, Edward III was so
strapped for cash that he hocked the crown jewels to
the Archbishop of Trier. When it was finally redeemed
from Flemish merchants several years later, Edward had paid more than 500 percent interest on the
original loan.90
To finance the war’s massive expenditures, Edward squeezed every possible source. At times he
even allowed his most senior commanders to be held
hostage or in prison due to bad debts.91 As his own
nation was squeezed dry, he often went hat-in-hand
to his Italian bankers, who exchanged hard cash for
the right to trade English wool and promises of excess
returns once the loans were repaid. Although Edward
put the money to good use and won a series of victories over the French, his debts eventually became
too great to manage. When he eventually defaulted
in 1339, he took down Italy’s two largest banking
concerns, the Bardi and Peruzzi families, and caused
a depression that hung over Europe for more than a
generation.92 This and other lesser defaults so wrecked
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English credit that pecuniary difficulties, rather than
defeats in battle, became a primary cause of England’s
defeat in the Hundred Year’s War. Within a decade
of Henry V’s death in 1422, England could no longer
afford to pay for sufficient mercenaries to stand up to
a resurgent and relatively financially sound France.93
By the time the Hundred Years’ War ended in 1453,
England was near financial destitution, and a newly
unified France was the European Continent’s reigning
military and financial power. As a final result of the
war, Italian bankers substantially withdrew from international lending in general, and from loans to kings
in particular.94
EARLY MODERN ERA
Toward the close of the medieval era, discoveries
of large silver deposits in the Holy Roman Empire
and the New World heralded a new epoch in warfare
and ushered in the modern era. For the next couple
of centuries, access to a tidal wave of bullion ensured
wars would be, long, bloody, and extremely expensive. To pay for these wars, kings turned to a new
breed of “merchant princes” whose financial acumen
made them indispensible to ambitious rulers. One of
the most dominant of these, but today almost forgotten, was the powerful Fugger family.95 Through their
control of the Holy Roman Empire’s mines and other
concessions, they first bought Charles V the Empire’s
crown and then financed his wars for over a generation. The Fuggers also played a major role in arranging
finance for other rulers, including Philip II of Spain. In
comparative terms, Bill Gates would have to increase
his personal wealth by a thousand times to even begin approaching the relative wealth of the Fuggers at
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their height. But even this vast wealth was no insurance against the vagaries of war and royal displeasure. The Fuggers were ruined when Spain could no
longer afford its wars and became a serial defaulter on
its loans, something it was to do with regularity for
decades to come despite having the riches of the New
World at its disposal. In fact, Spain’s inability to match
its ambitions to its admittedly vast, but not inexhaustible, riches sped its fall from the ranks of Europe’s
great powers.
Even at the heights of its power, Spain’s precarious
finances were seen as its Achilles’ heel. While Sir Francis Drake’s 1587 raid on the gathering Spanish fleet
in Cadiz is often credited with delaying the Armada’s
sailing for a year, this is only half the story. While
Drake’s raid was undoubtedly destructive, the root
cause of the delay was Philip II’s inability to borrow
the funds required to repair the damage. His bankers
in Genoa, who had replaced the nearly bankrupted
Fuggers in royal financial circles, buckled under considerable pressure from English merchants, mobilized
by the devious Sir Francis Walsingham, who demanded they not lend to Philip II.96 Because his Genoese
bankers let him down, Philip’s Grand Armada failed
to sail as planned, and England was given a year’s
respite to prepare for the great trial ahead.
Throughout this period, the Spanish empire also
waged an 80-year war with tiny Netherlands, a war
that became as much about credit ratings as it was
about intrinsic military power. The Netherlands was
eventually victorious because on a per-capita basis,
it could sustain a debt level multiples above what
Spain could afford. The reason was clear. Lenders
had learned to distrust monarchs, who would default
on a whim and leave them with no recourse. In fact,
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over the generations, many lenders learned that lending money to a king often led to prison or early death
whenever a ruler decided such methods were more
expedient than repaying loans. The Netherlands, on
the other hand, was a Republic, possessed of institutions that would endure long after any of its members
perished. Moreover, as many members of these governing institutions were merchants and bankers (the
ones making the loans), they had a vested interest
in making sure the government repaid its debts. Although lenders remained reluctant to lend to a single
ruler; they showed fewer qualms about lending to a
government with a ruling body such as a parliament
or congress.
During the course of the 80 Years’ War (1568-1648),
the Dutch “came to view war as a battle not only of
soldiers and guns, but also credit ratings.”97 As James
Macdonald relates from one Dutch participant in
the war:
Even if the country has no money, it still has credit, and
the enemy has neither funds nor credit, that I could
not deny that we might wear out the enemy through
this war, because this land has sufficient funds.98

While the Dutch made huge strides in harnessing
capital for military purposes, it was left to the British
to bring war finance into the modern age. Beginning
with Holland’s William of Orange’s assumption of
the crown in 1688 during the “Glorious Revolution,”
Britain first imported and then vastly improved on
Dutch financial methods. Faced with the enormous
costs of the wars against France’s Louis XIV, which
outstripped even the resources made available by the
adoption of Dutch methods, the British were forced to
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develop methods of finance never considered before,
and at that period in history, likely impossible for any
nation not possessing long-standing democratic institutions. This was the start of a true financial revolution which created a system of capital mobilization
that not only financed Britain’s wars on a previously
unimaginable scale, but also ushered in the Industrial
Revolution and the start of the modern era.99
The immediate impact of Britain’s entry into a long
series of wars with France was a rapid 300 percent increase in public expenditures. Government expenses
that were under £2 million a year in 1688 grew to £6
million by 1702.100 At first, Parliament attempted to
finance this huge expense the old-fashioned way—
increasing taxes and short-term loans. Soon, faced
with financial collapse and an impending default
that would have made Edward III’s experience with
the Bardi and Peruzzi banking families pale in comparison, Parliament began casting for ways to convert
short-term into long-term debt. After some trial and
error, they fixed on the establishment of the Bank of
England.
Upon its creation, the Bank served a very different role than Britons today view as the Bank’s raison
d’être. For, as the Bank’s original charter made plain,
at inception and for many decades thereafter, its central role was to help Britain finance its wars through
the creation of a “perpetual loan.” In fact, one of the
first directors of the Bank, Michael Godfrey, took this
part of the job so seriously that he joined William of
Orange at the siege of Namur in 1692. In the midst of
discussions over the king’s future financial needs, he
was killed by a musket ball while visiting a front-line
trench.101 No other Bank Director has ever again seen
it as part of his job to inspect the battlefront person-
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ally to see how wisely the Bank’s funds were spent.102
In any event, from that point forward, no British
government ever again defaulted or had to meet the
crushing economic burden of war by raising taxes to
economically destructive levels. Instead, funds were
raised only in amounts required to pay the incremental cost of the loan’s interest, producing a loan whose
principal might never be paid off. At times, even this
reduced burden appeared enough to doom Britain’s
financial stability, but Parliament always muddled
through. This was not true of most of the other nations
of Europe.
At the end of what may be properly called the
first truly world war—The War of Spanish Succession
(1702-13)—every major nation in Europe was fiscally
exhausted.103 For 3,000 years, wars had been limited by
the inability of pre-modern states to raise the financial
resources necessary to engage in conflicts on a grand
scale. But, by the dawn of the 18th century, new financial methods were coming to the fore, hugely increasing both the scope and cost of warfare. For instance,
William and Mary had been forced to issue £6,900,000
in debt to fight the War of the League of Augsburg
with France (1688-97). To fight the War of Spanish Succession, however, Britain issued £28,796,006 in new
debt.104 The war was barely affordable to Britain, but
proved ruinous to other nations’ fiscal positions, particularly France’s. Various nations attempted a wide
variety of schemes to consolidate their debts, and then
to follow the British lead in lengthening loan maturities (when they would have to pay them back). No
nation was quite able to replicate the British achievement, as it was based on institutions (Parliament)
other nations had yet to develop. The most notorious
of these schemes was established in France by the
Scotsman, John Law. It was Law’s idea that crashed
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most spectacularly, when the infamous “Mississippi
Bubble” popped.
Law’s notion involved replacing the use of gold
with paper money, expanding government debt, and
then transforming all of France’s old and new debt
into equity (stocks) of private firms, the most magnificent of which was the Mississippi Company. Law also
established the Banque Générale Privée (General Private
Bank) to handle paper money transactions, which
were issued in large volumes with the bank’s holdings
of government debt (three-fourths of the bank’s total
reserves) being used as capital. In 1720, Law combined
the bank and the Mississippi Company, along with
other ventures, into a single entity. Before the year
was out, an inevitable run on the bank, coupled with a
spectacular drop in Mississippi Company share prices
collapsed the entire system, forcing Law to escape
France dressed as a woman. The French government
chose to walk away from its debt obligations, plunging France into economic turmoil for a generation and
ruining the monarchy’s ability to secure international
credit up through the Revolution that deposed it.105 In
fact, France’s inability to regain its financial footing in
succeeding decades is considered by many historians
as the underlying cause of the French Revolution and,
by extension, the rise of Napoleon.
Without going into details, Britain handled its War
of Spanish Succession debt in manner quite similar to
France, with one crucial difference—Britain did not
walk away from the debt once the system came apart.
In Britain’s case, the operations of the Bank of England
were supported by the creation of the South Sea Company, which, over the course of a decade, absorbed
most of the government’s war debt in exchange for
equity in the company. When the company’s shares,
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which were propped up for a time by manipulations
of the market, imploded in 1720, Britain faced an existential financial crisis similar to France’s in the wake of
the bursting Mississippi Company bubble. But rather
than default on its obligations, Parliament compensated debtholders:
by splitting their claim on the capital of the South Sea
Company in half; one-half to be a claim on the equity
of a much reduced South Sea Company and whatever dividends it might produce in the future (never
to include payments in stock as that method is what
brought about the collapse in the first place), and the
other half as a claim on perpetual annuities that the
government pledged to pay 5 percent for 5 years before reducing payments to 4 percent.106

These perpetual annuities were a remarkable innovation. In practice, the British government never
had to repay the principal on its debt. Rather, it was
only required to pay the interest on these annuities—
named Consols—which by mid-century were being
issued at a regular rate of 3 percent. So, if the British government was in debt for £30 million, it never
had to worry about the day creditors would demand
payment. As long as the government could fund the
annual interest (£900,000), it could maintain the debt
indefinitely, with plenty of maneuvering room for
increases in times of emergency. In the event, debt
accumulated rapidly as Britain engaged in a series
of long and draining wars—the War of Austrian Succession, the American Revolution, and the Napoleonic
Wars. By the turn of the 19th century, even the innovative “perpetual annuities” based system was under
stress, forcing Parliament to find new revenue sources
(the first income tax) just to keep up with the inter-
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est charges. It remains a remarkable testament to the
financial system Britain crafted, as well as to British
fiscal probity, that the nation continues to pay interest
on debt issued to finance the war against Napoleon.
Two other factors must be considered when discussing Britain’s ability to sustain a huge national
debt. The first was the creation of a secondary market
for debt. The creation of consols (perpetual annuities)
made it possible for secondary markets to develop,
where original debt holders could shed the risk of
holding government debt by selling their consols to investors prepared to bear it. Economic historians Ann
Carlos and Larry Neal marked this issuance of “perpetual annuities” and their ability to be traded on secondary markets as the “defining financial innovation”
of Britain’s financial revolution.107 This secondary
debt market, in turn, greatly assisted the concentration of capital that propelled the start of the Industrial
Revolution.
Moreover, it was this financial revolution that underpinned Britain’s ability to finance debts far beyond
what contemporaries could have predicted based on
the nation’s size and population. No matter how hard
the tax collectors of other nations tried, they always
had to deal with a basic economic fact: there was only
so much wealth that could be taxed away from an
agricultural-based economy before the economic base
was destroyed. Typically, only a single-digit percentage of a nation’s “trapped” agricultural wealth was
available to support wars. Anything more and “geese
laying the golden eggs” died of fiscal exhaustion. Increasing global trade from the Reformation onwards
did increase revenues for all that participated, but they
paled in comparison to the wealth generated as fruits
of the Industrial Revolution. As Britain slowly moved
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from an agrarian economy to one based on trade and
industry, great concentrations of wealth were created
within industrial and trading centers (cities). In a remarkably short time, Britain added a rich merchant
class to her landed gentry, as well as a rapidly growing
middle class—all of whom possessed incomes worth
taxing. It was, in fact, William Pitt’s imposition of an
“income tax” on these people that made it possible for
Britain to support the interest on consols issued to finance the great wars with France in the late-18th and
early-19th centuries.108
For the rest of the 19th century, Britain made
good use of its financial innovations to take a consistent leading role in global affairs, far beyond what
her size and relatively small population should have
made possible. Britain was proving that in the modern
world, size did not matter near as much as its sound
finances. By the early-1800s, Britain could count on
its superior financial and taxation systems not only to
finance its own military, but also to carry a great deal
of its allies financial burdens during the wars against
Napoleon.109
As the century progressed, the harnessing of the
financial revolution with the Industrial Revolution
made it possible to create a true nation-in-arms, far
beyond the dreams of the French revolutionaries and
their levée en masse. Industry could now produce armaments in quantities that were entire orders of magnitude beyond what the artisans of the past were capable of manufacturing, while the Bank of England’s
consols could pay for them. Britain no longer was
forced to rely on storing vast treasuries so as to wage
war. Rather, its entire financial wealth could remain
working within the economy. By keeping as much
specie in circulation as possible, rather than hoard-
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ing cash and gold reserves for potential wars, Britain
maintained within its economy the high levels of liquidity required for rapid growth. By creating reliable
programs for emergency debt financing, peacetime
Britain could invest its income back into growing the
economy, while concurrently ensuring a ready source
of cash in the event of war.
Although the Napoleonic Wars placed a tremendous strain on British finances, they never cracked
under the stress. Still, to maintain its forces, as well as
the forces of many of its allies, the Exchequer had to
resort to many tricks, such as issuing 3 percent consols
far below par, effectively increasing the interest on
the total debt and offering consol holders huge capital
gains if the consols were ever redeemed at par (something no minister thought possible, given the huge
size of the debt). Also, for the first time, the propertied class, scared witless by the French Revolution,
actually began to pay something approaching what a
true assessment of their wealth would dictate. As one
historian noted:
Thus only the armies of France and the possible collapse of public credit persuaded Englishmen to accept
the income tax. Only the sustained threat to national
security from Napoleon, and to their high stake in
national wealth, persuaded the propertied classes to
assess their liabilities to pay, under the law, within tolerable margins of accuracy and of fairness.110

Of course, this war-induced surge in patriotic giving passed quickly. In the wake of the Battle of Waterloo and the end of the French threat, wealthy Britons
immediately began dismantling the fiscal underpinnings of the state (including the income tax).111
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Britain, however, had shown the way forward. For
almost a century after 1815—the Pax Britannica—Europe’s greatest nations pursued industrialization, state
centralization, and the creation of fiscal and monetary
institutions capable of funding renewed war.
WORLD WAR I
Nevertheless, old habits die hard, and before the
onset of World War I, many looked with trepidation
at the German war reserves stored inside the Spandau
Fortress. Rather than spend or invest a large segment
of the reparations France paid after the Franco-Prussian War, Germany stored away ₤70 million in gold
to defray the costs of a future war. When, on the eve
of war, someone reminded British Chancellor of the
Exchequer (and future wartime prime minister) Lloyd
George of this apparently massive gold reserve, he
responded, “A mighty sum, but England will raise
the last million.”112 It was a remarkable testament to
his faith in Britain’s capacity to finance a prolonged
conflict, as well as proof that his government realized
that the ability to raise massive sums of cash was the
determining factor in war.113
In any event, no one in 1914 could have envisioned
the colossal sums of cash 20th-century warfare would
consume. The much-feared Spandau gold reserves
proved insufficient to cover even a single month of
war expenses. While methods of finance had improved
considerably in the century and a half since Pitt the
Elder, they still strained under the stress. Without the
timely intervention of the United States and its mostly
untapped financial resources, the Allied financial system would have collapsed.114 Accessing this American
financial stream was by no means an easy task, and
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the scope of the effort involved was daunting. By 1916,
Britain was spending five million pounds a day on the
war, of which two million pounds was raised in the
United States. Still, it was not until the British credit
crisis of 1917 that the United States began providing
government-to-government credits to Britain.115
While the Allied financial system adjusted to the
demands of global war, industry also rapidly converted to meet new challenges. Though there were early
shortages of materiel as the combatants either built or
converted plants, once industry hit full stride, it easily
met war demands, particularly after the United States
added its massive production potential to the Allied
pool.116 British Cabinet minutes of the period reflect
continuous concerns about raising more millions of
pounds, but nary a word about running short of production capacity. While finance had closed the gap on
production, it had not yet caught up. As long as the
cash held out, there were always sufficient munitions
available for purchase. In fact, as Professor Hew Strachan points out, “Before 1914 the competition in arms
had created such abundance that there seemed little
need to consider wartime procurement. How the war
would be paid for promised to prove much more intractable.”117 In fact, the pre-war orthodoxy held that
the cost of modern war would be so prohibitive, nations would soon bankrupt themselves and the war
would end, according to one politician, no later than
July 1915, “when the means to pay for it would have
been exhausted.”118
Such worries were exacerbated by the common belief among national leaders that they were starting the
war with debt levels already approaching the maximum a nation could afford. When the war began, almost every major power was maintaining a debt level
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close to half of its gross domestic product (GDP), and
debt service was already the largest item on government budgets. Only Britain, which had made a concerted effort to reduce its debt after the expense of the
Boer War, was in a respectable debt position, at about
a quarter of GDP and requiring only 10 percent of the
government’s total budget for debt coverage.119 Britain’s wartime fundraising efforts also benefitted from
the fact that Lloyd George, in his 1909 to 1911 budgets,
had instituted progressive tax reforms that tapped
large amounts of wealth the rich had not previously
cared to contribute. These revenues were meant to
pay for social welfare programs, but were turned for
other purposes in 1914. As economic historian Glyn
Davies states:
[A] fiscal framework had therefore been fundamentally transformed on the eve of the First World War into
a much more buoyant source of revenue, ripe for the
insatiable demands of the military machine. What had
been introduced . . . for welfare thus became a timely
godsend for war.120

Even swelling tax revenues, with rates increasing
by a factor of 4.5 by war’s end, could not begin to meet
the voracious funding demands of global war on an industrial scale.121 Before the war ended, annual British
government expenditures were 13 times greater than
those of peacetime, similar to the burden all the other
major warring states faced.122 To meet these huge fiscal demands, Britain and other nations resorted to all
three major methods for advanced economies to raise
revenues: taxes, debt, and printing money.
Before the war ended, British national debt increased by a factor of 10, with the debt-to-GDP ratio
increasing from 26 percent to 127.5 percent.123 This is
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remarkably close to the debt-to-GDP ratios set by the
United States and Britain during World War II and
might therefore be considered the limits of what a nation can afford, even in wartime.124 To finance this debt,
Britain was forced to abandon the idea of perpetual
annuities in favor of issuing bonds with varying maturities.125 The post-war requirement to rollover this
debt placed tremendous strain on the British financial
system throughout the 1920s. Moreover, Britain, accustomed in previous wars to subsidizing its allies
(something it still did for France and others throughout the war), was forced to turn to others, particularly
the United States, to fund a substantial portion of the
war’s cost.126 When even all of this proved insufficient,
the Exchequer turned to printing money, doubling the
monetary base by war’s end. Some of this was inescapable, but as printing money was always an easy
escape from immediate financial difficulties, it was
kept at too high a volume for too long, stoking a near
ruinous inflation.127
In the end, Britain’s fiscal system proved up to the
task of funding a global war against other industrial
powers; but in doing so, the nation’s sterling based
fiscal system was placed under nearly unendurable
strain. As a result, the United States, already emerging
as a competitor for global financial leadership before
the war, was able to enhance its position as a global
financial center. U.S. financial might continued growing over the next 2 decades—albeit more in relative
than real terms during the Great Depression—positioning the United States as a global financial titan just
in time for World War II.
Although, for much of its course, World War I appeared to prove that powerful nations could wage
global war without money concerns, the reality turned
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out different when the war ended just as most warring nations were reaching the end of their financial
rope. There still remained room to expand production
of war materiel, but there was no money to pay for
such an expansion. In the end, although governments
had raised record amounts of cash, by 1918 the pattern
that held true since the beginning of recorded history
held firm: When the money runs out, the war ends.
Although America, through the offices of J. P. Morgan & Company, provided substantial financial aid to
Great Britain and other allies, it was not until America’s entry into the war in 1917 that the Unites States
placed its entire financial might behind the Allied effort. As such a deeper examination of how America
financed its own mobilization as well as a substantial
portion of Allied expenses for the final year-and-a-half
of war will illuminate how modern financial made
prolonged industrial warfare possible.
The American Experience.
World War I began just as the United States began feeling its way toward becoming a global financial power. For most of its history, the United States
had been a heavy importer of capital, with almost no
investment outflows to other nations. Soon after the
American Civil War, however, these huge capital inflows—instrumental in the building of the nation’s
railroads, canals, and financing industrial start-ups—
began tapering off. By the second half of the 19th
century, the United States was generating sufficient
excess capital to more than replace external financial
flows, making the nation’s economic growth self-financing. In fact, by the end of the century, the United
States was a large capital exporter, and loans to China,
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Germany, Sweden, Canada, and South America were
being floated in New York’s capital markets. In making these loans, “The United States was gaining experience for handling the creditor position it would
assume during World War I.”128
Adjusting to the new fiscal realities brought on by
accelerating industrialization, rapidly increased trade
flows (the first great process of globalization), and increasing GDP growth was not easy, and there were
many stumbles along the way. The financial panics of
1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 had caused great hardship
and greatly undermined faith in the U.S. financial system. It was the Panic of 1907, however, which finally
and fully revealed to the general public the impotence
of the U.S. Government to deal with a financial crisis.
In the face of this crisis, government actions were always a combination of late, insufficient, or ineffectual
ones. In the end, the financial system was rescued by
J. P. Morgan, who locked 50 top financers in his library
and forbade them food or drink until they agreed to
provide enough liquidity to fund the banking system
and to shore up the foundering U.S. financial infrastructure. As one contemporary noted:
But for the influence of J.P. Morgan, it is probable that
no united action would ever have been taken. It is certainly an element of weakness in our central money
market that influential credit institutions should have
to be dragooned into doing what is after all in their
own interests as well as to the general advantage.129

Unwilling to further entrust the U.S. financial future to the good graces of any single individual, Congress embarked on a number of reform measures over
the following years. The most notable of these, the imposition of an income tax (soon after the ratification of
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the 16th Amendment) and the creation of the Federal
Reserve System proved crucial to U.S. funding efforts
during the war. The income tax was levied for the first
time in the year before the war (1913). Approximately
368,000 persons from a total population of over 100
million paid just over $28 million into the treasury. By
1916, the income tax was yielding $68 million, which,
when added to the corporate tax ($57 million), was
enough to cover half of the nation’s defense budget in
that year. Unfortunately, it was only about 1/50th of
the annual cost of the budget, once the United States
entered into hostilities.130
The creation of the Federal Reserve (Fed) gave the
United States a powerful tool for the management of
the nation’s finances. Although the Fed experienced
substantial teething pains during its first months of
operations, it immediately made itself felt during the
war.131 The Fed, which began operations in 1914, was
established to overcome the problem with monetary
inelasticity. That is, at the start of every financial difficulty, persons and corporations immediately withdrew their money from the banking system and started
hoarding cash, gold, and silver. Such a rapid contraction of the money supply was usually enough to push
a minor hiccup in the system into a full-fledged crisis.
The Fed, through open market operations, and a host
of lesser means that became even more sophisticated,
became the lender of last resort. Rather than rely on
J. P. Morgan to force bankers to add liquidity to the
system, the Fed provided the U.S. Government the
means for boosting the money supply at the first sign
of a credit crunch.132
At the start of World War I, London, despite impressive gains by New York City, remained the financial capital of the world. “Sterling remained the
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world’s dominant currency,” and as Lloyd George
boasted, London was “transacting far more than the
whole of our business: we were transacting half the
business of the world as well, by means of paper transactions.”133 On the other hand, the United States was
mired in a recession at the outbreak of war, a situation
that rapidly reversed as European orders for food and
munitions began pouring in. By 1914, however, this
British dominance was already receding, as the United
States, whose GDP had grown seven times since the
Civil War, began replacing the “weary titan,” first in
its home markets and then abroad.134 Within months
of World War I’s eruption, exports exploded, and gold
flowed into the United States as payment. At the start
of the war, the United States held 19 percent of the
world’s gold stock. At war’s end, it had absorbed an
additional 16 percent of the world’s pre-war money
gold and increased its own stock by 88 percent.135 In
addition, Europeans sold $2 billion in U.S. securities,
while borrowing $2.4 billion during the first year of
the war alone. For the first time in its history, the United States became a creditor nation.
At the start of World War I, U.S. Government
spending averaged about $65 million a month, or on
an annual basis 2.3 percent of GDP. By the start of 1917,
spending had increased by $20 million a month, but as
inflation was roaring, the total expense as compared
to GDP fell (2.2 percent). After America’s entry into
the war, monthly expenses increased rapidly.136 By the
end of the war, the government was spending over $2
billion a month, about 32 percent of GDP on an annual
basis.137 Like all modern wars, the United States had
three main options for financing the war—increasing
taxes, raising debt, or printing new money.138 As it
turns out, the majority of the war effort was financed
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by borrowing (58 percent).139 The rest was paid for by
taxes (22 percent) and by printing money.140 As a result of these financing operations, what is now called
“high-powered money,” or the monetary base, more
than doubled.141 As the United States had yet to develop the measures to sterilize this excess cash, the
resulting inflation had a severe negative impact on the
economy.

Figure 5. Real GDP and Price Levels.
The total cost of the war was immense ($33 billion), equaling over 40 times the amount the government brought in from all sources in the year before
America’s entry. At first, the government was at a loss
as to how to meet such a vast expense, as no one had
any clear understanding of the best methods for war
financing on so vast a scale. There was, however, a
widespread consensus that most or as much as possible of the cost should be paid for through taxes. Sec-
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retary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo strongly advocated that taxes pay for at least 50 percent of
the war, dropping it to 33 percent later in the war.
As Hugh Rockoff points out, “There was no precise
theory behind these figures, but rather an intuition
that too much borrowing or too high a level of taxes
would be bad for the economy.”142 In the end, the U.S.
Government, similar to every other war participant,
combined a number of different approaches, including: increasing the income tax (the top rate went from
1.5 percent to over 18 percent), increased excise taxes
(alcohol and tobacco), and an increase in luxury taxes.
These tax increases on “sinners” and the rich were a result of President Woodrow Wilson’s adamant support
for the idea that the rich should pay for as much of the
war as possible.143 Surprisingly, the nation’s wealthy
industrialists, unwilling to risk being branded as war
profiteers, were strong supporters of increasing their
own tax burden.144
But tax changes are slow to take hold and rarely
popular with electorates. As a result, this war, like
every major war of the modern eras, was still largely
financed through increasing debt. To sell this vast
amount of debt, the Department of the Treasury drew
on the lessons from the Civil War. In that war, Secretary of the Treasury Samuel Chase enlisted the services of the firm of Jay Cooke to help sell national bonds
to as wide a spectrum of the American population as
possible. There is no doubt that Cooke was effective
in siphoning off funds from a large segment of the
middle class, but this time around, Secretary McAdoo thought the Treasury could do better on its own,
while also saving on the commissions that would be
incurred if the debt was sold through third parties. In
his unceasing efforts to sell debt to the masses, Sec-
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retary McAdoo traveled the country while simultaneously enlisting the aid of Hollywood and any other
influential groups that could help drum up support
for Liberty Bonds and later, Victory Bonds. This campaign exerted enormous social pressure to purchase
bonds, but its necessity remains an open question.145
At an average interest rate of 4 percent, coupled with
preferential tax treatment, these wartime issues of
debt were highly competitive with any other investment vehicle. Patriotism may have been part of the
selling technique, but purchasers were making a
hardy profit on their patriotic feelings. If these bonds
were purchased primarily to demonstrate support for
the war effort one would expect to see purchases below the prevailing market rates (patriotic duty). This,
however, did not occur at any point during the war.
Americans in general were apparently only willing
to financially support the war if forced to through increased taxes, or if rewarded through high investment
returns.146 Through such measures, some 20 million
persons—almost a quarter of the population—purchased Liberty Bonds in one form or the other.147
Unfortunately, the methods used by the Treasury
and the Fed proved to be highly inflationary.148 There
were many causes for this, but the primary one was
that the Fed “encouraged” its member banks to make
loans to individuals, which they could then use for the
purchase of war bonds. Investors could take out cheap
loans from banks and then buy bonds paying a higher
interest rate than what the banks were charging them
on the loans, thereby locking in a guaranteed (often
tax-free) profit equal to the spread between the two. In
practical terms, the Fed, by giving the banks the money to loan out for this purpose, was printing money,
although it went to great efforts to disguise this fact.

62

The government tried a number of expedients to
combat inflation during the war, but met with only
limited success. By 1918, the cost of bread had doubled, as did the cost of clothing. Some items, such as
sugar, quadrupled in price, while the overall cost of
maintaining the pre-war living standard increased by
two-thirds for the average household in just 2 years.149
The best that can be said for government efforts to
control inflation is that it probably curtailed it from
hitting ruinous proportions. Still, it was the overall
ineffectiveness of these anti-inflation programs that
cued policymakers to pay careful attention to price
levels for the much bigger financial effort required for
World War II.
By the end of the war, America had financed $33
billion of its own war costs, as well as over $10 billion
in war loans to other allies. By doing so, the nation
greatly expanded the depth and sophistication of its
capital markets, not to mention the size and scope of
the federal government.150 More importantly, the war
put the final nail in the coffin of British global financial supremacy. From this point forward, that position
would be occupied by the United States.151
WORLD WAR II
The American Experience.
For over 3 millennia, money had been the determining economic influence on war. As long as a ruler
or state had the equivalent of cash on-hand or someone
who was willing or could be forced to lend it to him, he
could continue prosecuting any war of his choosing.
There were always sufficient armories to produce war
materiel and enough men whose service was for sale.
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In every case examined to this point, a state’s money
gave out long before its productive capacity. This all
changed in World War II. For the first time, every major warring power ran out of production capacity long
before it ran out of money.152 As U.S. Secretary of War
Henry Stimson said after the war:
The one thing upon which the whole country was
agreed was that the services must have enough money. At no time in the whole period of the emergency,
did I ever have to worry about funds; the appropriations from Congress were always prompt and generous. The pinch came in getting money turned into
weapons.153

As further evidence that modern financial methods had closed the funding gap, the week after the
United States entered the war, head of the Fed Marriner Eccles announced he would throw the entire
power of the Fed behind the war effort, and that there
were more than sufficient funds available to pay for
the total mobilization of the country for war.154
In Britain, a new financial model—the Keynesian
Miracle—made it possible to borrow huge amounts at
record low rates. On the eve of war in 1939, Britain
temporarily abandoned the cheap money policy (offering only low interest rates to lenders) that had been
financing Depression Era deficits. The bank rate was
doubled from 2 percent to 4 percent, but when war
broke out and there was no sign of financial panic, it
was reduced to 3 percent, and then a month later back
to 2 percent.155 There the rate remained throughout the
war, only hitting 3 percent for short periods. In effect,
Britain fought World War II at only 40 percent of what
it would have cost if it had adopted the policies used
in World War I and, in relative terms, for about a third
cheaper than what it paid to fight Napoleon.
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To accomplish this, Britain adopted some rather
drastic methods, such as capital controls and rationing
of essentials (food and clothing), and made it nearly
impossible to purchase expensive nonessentials (cars
and refrigerators). To calm public opinion that some
industries (so-called war-profiteers) were making a
killing while they suffered, Britain first imposed a 60
percent excess profits tax. When that failed to impress
anyone, it was raised to 100 percent.156 The other crucial element of the British plan was to control what
Keynes called the ‘inflation gap” by taking excess cash
from consumers’ pockets through increased taxes.157
In 1939 alone, Britain raised income taxes by almost
20 percent for virtually the entire working population
(not just the wealthy). All of Britain’s indirect taxes
(on such non-necessities as sugar, alcohol, and tobacco) also rose sharply.
Despite these increases, revenues in the first year
of the war barely covered 50 percent of expenditures,
leaving a deficit of nearly a billion pounds.158 But as
Britain was financing the war at a mere 2 percent interest rate, even this huge and growing debt load appeared manageable, particularly after America began
its Lend Lease program. It also helped that, because of
both voluntary and forced measures, Britons had few
options for storing their money other than purchasing
government debt. This was particularly true after the
government got the banks to agree not to offer more
than 1 percent interest on savings accounts, making
purchasing government debt (bonds) twice as attractive to the average saver.159 Moreover, to better tap the
funds banks still had on hand (and deny the banks
opportunities to lend their funds for higher rates elsewhere), the government forced the banks to accept
Treasury Deposit Receipts in return for forced loans to
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the government. By the end of the war these receipts
(IOUs) made up over 40 percent of total bank assets.160
In the final analysis, Britain was able to finance
a huge global war remarkably cheap compared to
all other modern wars. It was the culmination of a
financial revolution begun by the Dutch in the 17th
century. For a time, in fact, it appeared that the iron
laws of economics had been repealed. In all previous
debt-financed wars, the more you borrowed, the more
interest you had to pay. In World War II, however,
Britain borrowed far more than ever before, at interest rates lower than ever before.161 Its national debt
rose from £7.25 billion in March 1939 to £23.75 billion by the time Germany surrendered. Yet, despite
the growth of inflationary pressures throughout the
war, Britain had entered a period of fiscal nirvana.162
Fortunately, the war ended before inflation broke
through the stringent controls and methods keeping
it in check. One is therefore left to wonder how much
longer this system of deficit spending could have gone
on before inflation brought it crashing down. As an
example of what might have happened if inflation
had escaped its binds, one need look no further than
Weimar Germany.
Similar to how it took over the financing of the Allied war effort in World War I, the United States acted
in much the same role after the attack on Pearl Harbor,
HI. As such, the fourth and final case study provides a
more in-depth examination of how America financed
4 years of global war.
The Financial Revolution Fulfills Its Promise.
The Roman statesman, Cicero, once noted, “Endless money forms the sinews of war.”163 However,
it was not until the 20th century that governments
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finally mastered the procedures necessary for tapping
their economic systems so as to provide these “endless” streams of money.164 Although the three historical methods of financing government spending (raising taxes, borrowing, and printing money) remained,
governments had become substantially more sophisticated in wielding these tools.165 In spite of, or maybe
because of, the nation’s experience in World War I, orthodox economic thinking at the beginning of World
War II still held that taxes should finance wars, on a
pay-as-you-go basis.166 This viewpoint had wide support across the political spectrum, as most politicians
considered printing money inflationary and debt financing as a burden on future generations. Moreover,
most believed that adding additional debt to the national balance sheet was particularly reprehensible
because the initial burden of paying it off would fall
on the same young men who had fought the war.167
Economists also believed that turning on the printing
presses would, at best, serve as an emergency stopgap
measure, which would rapidly lose its effectiveness as
hyperinflation outpaced the presses.168
An examination of World War II’s financing,
however, indicates that the printing press played a
much greater role than commonly assumed, particularly in the early war years.169 For at least the first 2
years of the war, the Fed’s printing presses worked
overtime, and the money supply expanded accordingly.170 Such a rapid expansion, if kept up for too
long a period, would, of course, have crippled the
economy as inflation took hold. But in the exigency
of the moment, it was the only method fast enough to
fund the jump-start and rapid growth of production
necessary to meet immediate war needs.171 In the first
place, the government-instigated monetary contrac-
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tion, which had extended the length and depth of the
Depression more than any other single factor, had not
been rectified by the time the United States entered
the war.172 So, there was room to expand the stock of
money without sparking inflation, particularly as the
government had halted the production of high ticket
durable consumer items. Leon Henderson, head of
the Office of Price Administration, began instituting
relatively effective price controls.173 Moreover, if businesses were going to expand, they required immediate working capital, and there was plainly not enough
of it available in the economic system in 1941.174 In
short, the in-circulation monetary base (cash or nearcash equivalents) in 1941 was too small to support the
daily activities of the massive American economy as
it mobilized for war.175 Unless the government added
cash to the system quickly, there was a real possibility
the entire mechanism would seize up.176
The Federal Reserve Bulletin for December 1942
noted that the government had financed 75 percent of
its expenditures in the first year of the war through
borrowing, with the remaining 25 percent through
taxation.177 This was somewhat disingenuous because
it failed to reflect how the Federal Reserve System
creates money. Since the start of the Federal Reserve
System in 1913, the primary method of adding liquidity to the monetary system was by altering the reserve
requirement that members of the system had to keep
on deposit with the Federal Reserve. In peacetime,
this is a highly effective method, but several overlapping factors often led to lag times between reserve rate
changes and expansion of the monetary base. In the
emergency of global war when the funds necessary to
finance rapid expansion are needed immediately, the
government could not tolerate this lag.178
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In the spring of 1942, the Federal Reserve changed
its method of injecting liquidity (cash) into the system by hugely increasing its reliance on “Open market Operations”—buying government bonds directly
from member banks. This was initially accomplished
by setting a fixed buying rate on Treasury bills.179
Under this policy, as the Federal Reserve Bulletin
stated, “member bank reserves are almost automatically supplied, with the initiative being taken by the
member banks rather than by the Federal Reserve
System.”180 What this meant in reality was that member banks were allowed, and encouraged, to buy as
much government debt as they wanted, or purchase
other securities (commercial debt), or make loans as
they desired, provided that, among the securities they
acquired, were sufficient treasury bills to exchange
at Federal Reserve banks for whatever additional reserves were needed to meet the accompanying expansion in reserves.181 That is, the government turned the
formulation and execution of monetary policy over to
the commercial banks, with a blanket authorization
to produce as much wartime monetary expansion as
they found profitable.182 In short, the Fed gave banks
a license to print money . . . all they wanted!
How did this work in practice? As the public purchased government securities, the payments were
credited to U.S. Government accounts in various commercial banks. This process automatically reduced
the amount of cash reserves banks were required to
keep on hand. Eventually, Treasury transferred these
excess reserves to the various regional Federal Reserve banks, which then used them in payment for
the purchase of war supplies and other government
expenditures. The government’s admonition to keep
these reserves fully invested at all times, coupled
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with the natural desire of profit-making institutions
to increase their holdings of interest-bearing investments, encouraged banks to use their reserves to purchase large amounts of government bonds, both during bond drives and on the secondary market.183 The
banks made most such purchases directly from the
Treasury when possible; otherwise, they were bought
from private investors. The need to keep reserves employed until they were called for by the Central Bank
also caused banks to make sizable loans to customers for the purchase of government securities, most of
which these customers later sold to banks. Both the direct purchase of government debt and the funding of
customers to do so tended to increase a bank’s future
reserve requirement. This increase showed up several
months later, when the Treasury spent its new deposits and the funds reappeared in the accounts of banking customers. However, the announced policy of the
Federal Reserve System to purchase Treasury bills at
a fixed rate eliminated any fear that the bank might
have trouble meeting future reserve requirements.
As long as this policy continued, any bank could purchase any volume of U.S. Government securities for
its own account, or could loan any volume of money to its customers for any purpose without fear of
inability to meet future reserve requirements.
So why did this license to print money not lead to
the ultimate financial devastation of the system? In
time, of course, it would have, but two things stopped
the banks from undertaking an immediate unbridled
monetary expansion that would have led to hyperinflation and ruin. First, the U.S. banking system remained largely fragmented, with over 16,000 national
and state-chartered banks across the country.184 Most
of these banks and bankers across the country simply
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lacked the economic sophistication to spot the opportunity presented to them. More important, though,
were memories of the Great Depression and the numerous banking panics of previous decades. Though
on a practical basis the new Federal Reserve wartime
policies had eliminated the need for reserves, most
of the Depression-scarred banking community still
thought it prudent to hold sufficient reserves on-hand
for emergencies.185
The Government was issuing debt in quantities
so huge that it would be impossible for the economy
to digest those sums without massive interest rate increases to make bond purchases attractive. To clear
the debt, the Federal Reserve became the buyer of last
resort and purchased as much of the debt as necessary to keep the price and interest rate at a previously
agreed pegged rate—called monetizing the debt.186
These purchases created government-owned deposits
on the books of the Fed, which equated to the banking system’s receiving additional reserves, which its
banks then used to expand their asset holdings (making loans) while creating additional deposit money.187
Thus, one must consider the portion of the debt issued
by the government that banks or private investors, using bank financing, bought back as printed money,
although the Federal Reserve resisted such thinking
at the time.
This means that 75 percent of the government’s
expenditures in 1942 was not, in reality, financed
through debt securities. Instead, the government
funded a substantial portion of its purchases through
money creation.188 Estimates are that as much of 42
percent of wartime spending in 1942 was the result of
turning on the printing presses, while actual nongovernment financed bond sales paid for approximately
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34 percent, with taxes paying the remaining 24 percent. This situation reversed by 1944, when taxes and
a much reduced amount of debt sales sufficed to cover
expenses.189
If politicians and economists were in agreement
that creating money was the worst possible way to finance the war, and raising taxes was the best, how did
the reverse become policy, at least in the United States
in the early war years? The overriding problem facing
the U.S. Government during World War II was how
to raise the staggering amounts of money required
by war.190 If it performed the job well, the government could stabilize the economy, which would make
preserving the soundness of the currency immeasurably easier. If done badly, it might have destroyed the
entire economy.
For example, most historians agree that Germany’s
failure to adequately address its war financing needs
was a contributing factor to the general disruption of
its economy in the aftermath of World War I. By failing adequately to tax its economy to meet wartime
expenditures, the Germans left it up to their central
bank to raise the necessary funds on a credit basis.
This negligence, plus military defeat, contributed to
the ruinous inflation that wiped out the value of most
of German society’s economic assets in the early postwar period—The Great Weimar Inflation.191
During World War II, the Treasury Department
had the responsibility of raising sufficient funds to
wage the war. In this regard, it focused on keeping
interest rates low and thereby minimizing the cost of
servicing the debt.192 The Federal Reserve’s principal
concern was to ensure that the means used to raise
funds were as noninflationary as possible. To the extent that these funds did not come from taxation or
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borrowed savings, the United States had to raise its
financial wherewithal through the banking system. In
other words, the federal government used the banks
to create sufficient credit.193
In the process, the Federal Reserve confronted a
dilemma. On the one hand, the system had to supply
the banks with the reserves required to support credit
expansion (give the banks money so they could buy
government bonds). On the other, it was the Fed’s responsibility to neutralize the inflationary potential of
newly created money (usually done by taking money
away from banks). However, there was no satisfactory
way to neutralize the money that would not, at the
same time, either raise the cost of debt substantially
or contract available credit (if you take the banks’
money away to control inflation, you have to raise
interest rates to attract the limited amount of money
banks still have thereby increasing the cost of funding
the war). The most the Federal Reserve could do was
to go about its business with sufficient care to slow
the impact.194
That inflation remained low, or at least within reasonable limits, was the result of three things. The first
was creation of the Office of Price Administration in
1942. That organization possessed sweeping powers
to control prices and establish rationing programs on
products in short supply. The second was the fact that
conversion to wartime production brought a halt to
the manufacture of almost all big-ticket consumer durables, such as automobiles and refrigerators.195 The
wartime boom may have given consumers more cash
than they had previously, but they did not have much
on which to spend it. Third, and in many ways the
most important, was the self-restraint consumers exhibited due to their post-war expectations. Virtually
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all Americans had vivid memories of the Great Depression and believed that the current prosperity was
a wartime boom. There was widespread trepidation
that the Depression would return as soon as the war
ended. Many, therefore, took the sensible precaution
of saving, rather than spending, their windfall.
Was it necessary to go this route? During the 6 fiscal years from July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1946, the federal
government spent $387 billion, of which $330 billion
was for national defense (approximately three times
the annual spending rate for World War I). The Treasury raised $397 billion, of which taxation garnered
$176 billion, or 44 percent (most of this in the second
half of the war).196 Moreover, politicians were aware
that taxation provided many benefits over the other
two methods of finance. First of all, taxation distributed the cost of the war while it was being fought,
rather than imposing the costs on future generations,
and was therefore considered more ethical and fair.
Taxation also fought inflation, as it had an almost
dollar-for-dollar impact on inflation, because consumers cannot spend dollars the government has taken
from them. Finally, taxation alleviated many negative
post-war economic effects. This was because greater
amounts of wartime borrowing meant greater postwar taxation in order to service the resulting debt.
Furthermore, large amounts of government securities
in private hands at the end of a war could easily provide sufficient liquid assets to stoke serious inflation,
as was to happen in 1947-49.197
So why did the government not raise tax levels to
cover the expense of war? First of all, there was the
need to provide incentives to workers. During the
war, the government wanted every worker to make a
maximum effort to increase production levels. Taxes
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not only discourage workers by making them feel
poorer, they also have a negative impact on the human desire to earn extra dollars, which they believe
will only end up in the hands of the government.
Moreover, politicians are reluctant to place tax burdens on constituents to whom they will eventually
find themselves accountable. When faced with a vote
on a tax increase, politicians can easily forget about
the burden to future generations, in favor of keeping
today’s voters happy.198
The major determining factor in financial decisions
by far was the one that receives little coverage from
the economic historians of the period, namely time.
The emergency was now, and the need to pay for the
war was immediate. This need was particularly pressing in the first year of major rearmament, when the
American economy had to provide resources to build
or expand factories and construct the infrastructure
on which the expansion of the military establishment
depended. Passing new tax laws through Congress
and then establishing the apparatus on which to assess and collect those taxes would have been a timeconsuming affair. Though Congress authorized a new
tax structure in April 1942, it was almost a year before
substantial new revenues began to find their way into
the Treasury.199 Bond drives that focused on sales to
private individuals had the same problem: they took
months to organize and publicize.
The maturity of the Federal Reserve System, born
in the early days of World War I, provided an already
in-place and efficient system to raise vast amounts of
cash in a remarkably short period of time. It was not
without risks, but, properly managed, the system provided a stopgap until taxation and bond drives could
begin to provide the bulk of governmental funding re-
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quirements. Even after taxation had reached its maximum wartime limit, the Federal Reserve continued
to guarantee sufficient bank liquidity to ensure that
bond drives always met their goals without ever going over the 3 percent interest cost on offered bonds.
By any measure, the American banking system, controlled by the Federal Reserve System, provided the
allies with a financial engine that relatively easily
assumed the burdens of war finance. Although the
strains on it were enormous, every indication is that
the Federal Reserve could have created substantially
greater funding, without collapsing the system, even
if the war had continued for several more years.200
The Federal Reserve banks themselves absorbed
approximately $22 billion of the public debt, while
creating a favorable environment for absorption of
roughly $95 billion more by commercial banks. Moreover, from June 1941 through December 1945, investors other than Federal Reserve commercial banks
absorbed approximately $129 billion of government
securities.201 In sum, this was close to all of the government’s spending on the war, and even in 1945,
these sources were far from tapped out. In fact, the
continuing high levels of savings that propelled the
post-war boom could easily have provided additional
war funds if required. For the first time in history, a
government exhausted production capabilities long
before it exhausted the funding sources required to
pay for new munitions. Such a state of affairs could
not have continued forever, but it lasted long enough
to win the war.
The Federal Reserve held true to the promise it
had made almost immediately after Pearl Harbor,
when it issued the statement that the “system’s powers would be thrown completely behind the war ef-
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fort,” and that there were “sufficient funds available
to prosecute the war on a massive scale until victory.”
At the time, there were many politicians who doubted
this was possible.202 However, there is no record that
any economist during the period doubted that the system could fulfill the Federal Reserve’s boast.203 Government had, for the first time in 3,000 years, devised
methods to pay for total war over an indefinite period
of time. When the test came, these methods proved
effective at managing the fiscal machine.204
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Throughout history, the ability to mobilize huge
amounts of capital has been the true sinew of power
and the most important ingredient in waging successful war. For 2,500 years, since the Battle of Marathon,
Western rulers have been on a continuous search for
new sources of capital, and better methods of getting
their hands on it. By the middle of the 20th century,
major states appeared to have finally found and mastered the techniques of tapping the greater portion of
their nation’s financial resources. During World War
II, national leaders might be forgiven for believing
they had finally found the inexhaustible golden goose.
But by 1945, it was clear that for most of these nations,
the goose was on his last legs. Only the United States
still possessed the financial resources to continue the
conflict at the intensity of the prior several years, but
even in America signs of strain were developing.
The post-war economic surge revived the geese for
a time. But 7 decades later, it is apparent that many nations are arriving at what might be called a “Keynesian limit,” and will find it progressively more difficult
to place further debt on their balance sheets. Many
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economists, addressed this long-run problem—debt
growing beyond a nation’s ability to service the interest—to Keynes when he first voiced his idea of using
debt financing to jump-start economic growth. His famous reply was: “In the long-run, we’re all dead.”205
Well, Keynes is long gone, as are all of those that began
this Keynesian experiment with him. Unfortunately,
for the rest of us, the long-run, if has not arrived, is on
the visible horizon.
Everyday, the world is witnessing Europe’s increasingly desperate attempts to shore up its Eurobased financial systems. Although a series of patches
may hold the system together for a few years, such
fixes are likely to only postpone the final, probably
catastrophic, reckoning. Moreover the U.S. financial
system, unless policy changes are enacted in the near
future, may not be far behind. The nation’s per-capita
debt-to-GDP ratio is already worse than Greece’s and
set to nearly double over the next 15 years. Worse,
over the next few decades, the nation faces approximately $100 trillion in unfunded liabilities—seven
times the current GDP. There is a law of economics
that states: “What cannot happen, will not happen.” At
some point, therefore, the United States will default.
Whether such a default will be a catastrophic financial
collapse (through outright default or hyperinflation)
or a default of expectations (entitlements curtailed) is
yet to be determined.
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Figure 6. America’s Per Capita Government Debt
Worse than Greece.
As far as national security and America’s ability
to wage a large war is concerned, the nation’s current
debt burden places the country in uncharted territory.
During World War II, we learned that the nation could
support its military endeavors by growing the national debt from 40 percent of GDP to approximately 120
percent. In a future national emergency it remains an
open question of how much higher the debt to GDP
ratio can go. To wage World War II, we tripled the
debt to GDP per capita ratio. Is such a feat possible
if the nation starts any future tripling at debt already
over 100 or 200 percent of GDP? We are entering uncharted territory. In the past, nations accrued debt to
finance wars. Now that debt is being accrued to finance domestic programs. Because the United States
has a massive economy and remains the world’s reserve currency, it has the capacity to manage its current debt load. It remains an unanswered question if
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it could handle a doubling of that debt to finance the
reaction to a national emergency. Though no one is
certain what the nation’s financial breaking point is,
there most certainly is a breaking point, and we are
racing toward it.
When Paul Kennedy wrote The Rise and Fall of
Great Powers 25 years ago, he predicted a U.S. financial collapse brought about by excess defense spending—“Imperial Overstretch.” Kennedy, of course, diagnosed the right disease, but he selected the wrong
patient. Imperial overstretch was an actual phenomena, but it was the Soviet Union it was killing. If Kennedy was to rework his manuscript today, he would
surely note that it was not imperial overstretch that
threatens U.S. fiscal health. Rather, it is “entitlement
overstretch,” a phenomenon he could not have been
expected to note 25 years ago as there was no historical parallel to alert him to the danger. Now, however,
that danger is all too visible. In some future national
emergency, it is quite likely that the United States may
find itself in a position where it cannot raise the funds
required to defend the nation, a state of affairs that has
been all too common over the long sweep of history.
Today’s strategists and policymakers must take
this financial limit into account, as in a future national
emergency the U.S. debt position will start at approximately where the nation finished World War II. It is
therefore uncertain whether the financial revolution
that began in the late-17th century can be extended
into the next. There is a very real possibility that we
are approaching a “Keynesian Limit” that will negatively impact the nation’s ability to finance a major
mobilization, if one should prove necessary.
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